Ex-Nazi "Bookkeeper of Auschwitz" Asks for 'Forgiveness'

[Mayerling]

Thanks for the responses Fleetwood.

Funny about Churchill - had Britain avoided war in 1914 or 1939 I doubt if many people would recall him today (and I doubt if he would have been Prime Minister).

You got the quote from Edward Grey almost correct: "The lights are going out all over Europe...." Rather striking bit of poetry but he actually was referring to the closing of national embassies between belligerent countries.

I know it was France that somehow got Russia and Britain to ally together in 1907, but I never understood why the alliance stuck. At one point Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas II signed a preliminary draft of a treaty in the gulf on Finland when they met on their yachts, and it actually would have ended the critical Russian - French alliance (and, theoretically the Triple Entente) but the treaty was rejected by Nicholas' advisors when he returned home. Pity.

Somehow the Anglo-Russian alliance never made sense. In fact, during the Russo - Japanese war (in 1905) there was a serious danger of Britain and Russia coming to blows first when a fleet of British trawlers off Dogger Bank were fired on by the nervous Russians, who thought they were being surprised by the Japanese navy.

Jeff

[Fleetwood Mac]

declaration of war in August 1914 against Germany was pegged not on the Balkan business at Sarajevo, but German violation of Belgian neutrality, which was horse of a different color. I don't think any British government could have ignored it.

Jeff,

Right up to the eve of war it was in the balance which way the British Government would go.

In fact, the majority of the liberal cabinet were against the war.

The British Government had given no guarantee to the French or the Germans, and did this deliberately in attempt to deter them from going to war.

The Belgian issue was undoubtedly a factor because it was felt that in the event we did not honour our guarantees we would lose all respect and it follows partners.

There were many competing and conflicting opinions up until the outbreak of war. Germany was a very respected country, and some found it inconceivable that we could fight a war on the side of the Russians against the Germans - the Russians viewed as barbarians; the Germans as highly civilised. Others felt it was a European issue and not our problem.

When it came down to it the British Government felt it was too much of a risk to take that the Germans would defeat the French and control their ports. The Belgium issue was used as the stick to cajole others into coming round to the way of thinking that Britain had no option but to intervene.

Sir Edward Grey, against the war, said something like: "the lights have gone out all over Europe" on the eve of war, and this was pretty much the feeling in England apart from among jingoistic Tories - the end of an era and the good times. Never were truer and more prophetic words spoken.

A huge, terrible mistake from which this country has never recovered. I wonder if Grey truly realised the enormity of the British Government's decision to go to war, and his and his colleagues' actions by not holding steadfast to their guns when a few war hawks in the cabinet, including Churchill, shouted the loudest.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Hi Fleetwood,

I'm just trying to fit things together here regarding 1918-1919. From what you are saying the Lloyd George government was only trying to maintain British interests at Versailles. But his "Khaki Election" Campaign (1918) had a slogan - "Squeezing Germany until the pips squeak!" or something to that affect. At least that is what I understood. If that is correct, the British delegation was actually also looking for some restitution (financial or material) from Germany. In fact, the U.S. was (again my understanding of this) rather restrained at this point about restitution. We did pursue Germany in the law courts over acts of sabotage (the "Black Tom Island" incident in 1916), but I can't recall a determination to actually demand huge financial payments from Germany. In fact, later on we created two separate if somewhat inadequate financing plans to assist the Germans in paying off British and French demands.* And Britain and France actually tried to encourage us to pick up mandates in the Middle East like Lebanon and Palestine (which the Wilson administration wisely refused to consider).

[*The second was the "Dawes Plan". I can't recall the first one.]

If I am wrong please clear it up to me

Jeff

Hi Jeff,

The point to bear in mind here is that the whole point for us was to keep the Germans away from the North West coast of France and it follows secure our trade routes.

Once the Germans were pushed back and surrendered then that was job done, which is why the British military refused to go along with the idea of marching into Germany against the wishes of the Allies. We had nothing to gain from that, because the whole point was to get them out of France.

We had no desire to ruin Germany. In fact, Germany was an important trade partner for us, only not when they were in charge of the North West coast of France. Commentators here, including Keynes, instinctively felt it was a bad idea, unfair and not in our interests to burden Germany with an insurmountable problem, and this explains why re-taking the Rhineland didn't cause a ripple in this country.

Chamberlain followed in the steps of his predecessors. Fair aims such as Germans in one country and re-uniting Germany, then why should we rock a boat that had served us well; invading the non-German Czech part of Czechoslovakia and Poland then that was a different matter. The cat was out of the bag when they went into the remainder of Czechoslovakia and Britain began to prepare for war immediately. Chamberlain's policy was a typically English pragmatic and reasonable policy.

Churchill, widely regarded as the man who turned the country against Appeasement, did no such thing. Britain knew war was coming in 1938 and began to prepare, long before Churchill took office. And, there was no such policy of 'Appeasement'. The majority of Englishman agreed with the Germans on a point of principle that it was their country and their people. As soon as they strayed from this, British policy changed.

As for the United States at Versailles. Obviously Wilson was a liberal and truly believed in the principles of a just peace and self-determination. The problem was that the United States had invested a lot of money into this war and they wanted it back. Most of it was loaned to Britain who passed it on to France and Italy to keep the war effort going. The French and Italians had none to give back, we had some but nowhere near enough. And, so the Americans did an about turn in 1919 and decided they must make Germany pay in order to get their money back.

The War Guilt Clause was not envisaged until the Americans realised the only chance they had to get their money back was from Germany, and in order to do that and make them pay reparations they needed to have the War Guilt Clause inserted into the treaty. The German delegation who walked up the steps in June 1919 had no idea how severe the treaty was going to be, because the Allies stance hardened between the end of the war and this date.

[Mayerling]

Except Chamberlain had no less backbone than anyone else.

What Chamberlain did was a continuation of British foreign policy not a change.

It had always been felt that continental Europe was a place full of trouble, and in the event they want to kill one another then **** 'em, get on with it, we have commercial interests elsewhere.

There was only one time in the entire history of England that we sent an army to continental Europe at the outbreak of war and that was WW1, a grave mistake. Every other time we only got involved when one party was threatening to dominant the continent, e.g. Napoleon.

Chamberlain's policies were typically English, and the vast majority of people had no problem with Germans in one country, or Germans taking back the Rhineland. It was theirs. It's called respecting sovereignty.

What really boils my piss is the idiot tories and liberals ruined this country for their own ill-conceived goals, but Chamberlain, and I'm no tory, did the right thing. Their country; their business.

Sorry but I was considering the statement that when England sent the army to the continent in August 1914 it was a grave mistake. I'm not sure the Asquith government could have sat it out and watched, because the declaration of war in August 1914 against Germany was pegged not on the Balkan business at Sarajevo, but German violation of Belgian neutrality, which was horse of a different color. I don't think any British government could have ignored it.

I will grant you this - by sending that force to the Continent, supposedly to help Belgium due to the invasion, and to keep in touch with the Entente Cordial with France, Asquith and his cabinet would have also been aware that in the wake of the Curragh fiasco in Ireland such a foreign intervention would cover over the government's embarrassment, and the possibly treasonous behavior of the military leadership by giving them another target to set their eyes on. In that case I have to really wonder about the Belgian intervention.

Jeff

Boy this is getting complex!

[Mayerling]

As it happens, Robert, there's no use in a passive aggressive stance with me. You'd be much better served by reading about these things.

Britain was at the peace treaty to serve our interests, and it was felt that our interest was not in following the French line of trying to ruin Germany forever, nor the American line of attempting to extract an impossible amount of money from Germany.

Quite simple really, when you pick up a book.

Hi Fleetwood,

I'm just trying to fit things together here regarding 1918-1919. From what you are saying the Lloyd George government was only trying to maintain British interests at Versailles. But his "Khaki Election" Campaign (1918) had a slogan - "Squeezing Germany until the pips squeak!" or something to that affect. At least that is what I understood. If that is correct, the British delegation was actually also looking for some restitution (financial or material) from Germany. In fact, the U.S. was (again my understanding of this) rather restrained at this point about restitution. We did pursue Germany in the law courts over acts of sabotage (the "Black Tom Island" incident in 1916), but I can't recall a determination to actually demand huge financial payments from Germany. In fact, later on we created two separate if somewhat inadequate financing plans to assist the Germans in paying off British and French demands.* And Britain and France actually tried to encourage us to pick up mandates in the Middle East like Lebanon and Palestine (which the Wilson administration wisely refused to consider).

[*The second was the "Dawes Plan". I can't recall the first one.]

If I am wrong please clear it up to me

Jeff

[Fleetwood Mac]

Sorry, Fleetwood, but you still haven't explained what Chamberlain was doing at Munich. Keeping the lid on instability? You mean like when a guy goes into a bank and says "Help keep the lid on instability by giving me all the money - because if you don't, I will shoot you"?

I did explain it, but you missed the point.

I would have thought the Pax Britannica didn't need an introduction.

[Robert]

Sorry, Fleetwood, but you still haven't explained what Chamberlain was doing at Munich. Keeping the lid on instability? You mean like when a guy goes into a bank and says "Help keep the lid on instability by giving me all the money - because if you don't, I will shoot you"?

[Fleetwood Mac]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

As it happens, Robert, there's no use in a passive aggressive stance with me. You'd be much better served by reading about these things.

Britain was at the peace treaty to serve our interests, and it was felt that our interest was not in following the French line of trying to ruin Germany forever, nor the American line of attempting to extract an impossible amount of money from Germany.

Quite simple really, when you pick up a book.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

Chamberlain was in Munich doing what we'd always done. Granting the odd concession while aiming to keep the lid on instability. We'd done this for centuries and it worked.

[Robert]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

[Fleetwood Mac]

If I could rewrite history - Chamberlain would have had more common sense and backbone at Munich

Except Chamberlain had no less backbone than anyone else.

What Chamberlain did was a continuation of British foreign policy not a change.

It had always been felt that continental Europe was a place full of trouble, and in the event they want to kill one another then **** 'em, get on with it, we have commercial interests elsewhere.

There was only one time in the entire history of England that we sent an army to continental Europe at the outbreak of war and that was WW1, a grave mistake. Every other time we only got involved when one party was threatening to dominant the continent, e.g. Napoleon.

Chamberlain's policies were typically English, and the vast majority of people had no problem with Germans in one country, or Germans taking back the Rhineland. It was theirs. It's called respecting sovereignty.

What really boils my piss is the idiot tories and liberals ruined this country for their own ill-conceived goals, but Chamberlain, and I'm no tory, did the right thing. Their country; their business.

[Robert]

Hi Jeff

Yes it's true that each generation will offer a new interpretation, which is a good thing. I suppose that historians are like philosophers - they have to re-construct their boat - on the open sea!

For my part I would have thrown the Germans out of the Rhineland in 1936.

And of course some quite ordinary things should have been done, such as locking up Hitler for a good long stretch after 1923 - but that was the Germans' fault.

[Mayerling]

Hi Robert,

Yeah, there is nothing like iron-boot terror tactics on one's own population to bring a great deal of silent dread to the opposition. Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin all knew this, as did the Japanese militarists.

A comment you made earlier about what F.D.R. labelled as "iffy history" (yes, it's his term!) is true - one can do the Monday quarterback approach, but all historical analysis is that. I was a history major in college, and one of the courses that is required is "historiography". This is actually a course on the different styles of writing history up to the present and how each is valuable for interpretations, but each is always flawed. That's why we constantly get new books on old subjects, usually on an anniversary of an important date. The flaw is built in: the writer of history is going to take into the writing of the subject not only his or her research, but the point of view that has been put into the writer by the time of the writer's own life. An example of this: the classic history of England by Thomas Macauley. It is still quite worth reading, but nowadays we tend to question the "Whig" school of thinking that Macauley championed. He did not question the "Glorious Revolution" and it's aftermath because of how he saw the events of English history from 1670 to 1689. He saw a tamping down on English liberty of thought in the reign of James II and the tyranny of that monarch's government in putting down Monmouth's Rebellion with the "Bloody Assizes" of Judge Jeffreys.

No denying this is true, and one credits Macauley with severely questioning the character of certain parties (the young and up-and-coming John Churchill, for example, whom Macauley rightly considers an opportunist). But given the anti-Catholicism in England that faced the Roman Catholic James, can one seriously blame him for his policy blunders? Judge Jeffreys and Judge Scroggs may be blots on jurisprudence, but is that pillar of Protestantism Titus Oates any better? Again to his credit Macauley called a spade a spade and detested Oates and other informers of the period, swearing away the lives of people.

Well, the point is (and sorry for diverting a 20th Century discussion to the 17th Century for a moment) interpretation is going to change, and we will are not at the end of it. Hence our embracing those "iffy" history points, no matter how seemingly useless they are in the final analysis. The Armada was defeated in 1588. Booth did not fail at Ford's Theatre 150 years ago last week. The Lusitania did land at the bottom of the Irish Sea 100 years ago next month.

My own personal view of the events for 1938-1945 are intensely aggrevated by what happened to millions of innocent lives due to a handful of intensely evil men (and I refer to Nazis, though I can consider Stalinist Communists as bad, and note "questionable" moves and policies of people supposedly more decent). If I could rewrite history - Chamberlain would have had more common sense and backbone at Munich, walked out with Deladier, and within a few weeks the Czech air force would have been laying waste to Dresden, Hamburg, Frankfort, and Munich itself far ahead of schedule. Then perhaps that silenced opposition in Germany would have roused itself to lynch it's Chancelor and his minions. Of course the problem is, it might have roused itself to support a war effort against Czechoslovakia.

Jeff

[Robert]

Hi Jeff

Yes, the French were terribly divided. Theoretically the Germans should have been just as divided but Nazi brutality at home, and foreign policy successes abroad, quietened most of the opposition.

[Mayerling]

Fleetwood, while it's true that as time went on the 'Big Two' tended to make the decisions, I think you underestimate the pull we had on the Americans. For instance, we got them to prioritise the war with Germany, when they really wanted to get at Japan. And, being Americans, they wanted an early Second Front - 1942, certainly 1943. We weren't ready, the Americans weren't ready, and so they had to wait.

As for France, we can go on all day with 'ifs' - if the British had had Marlborough, if the French had had Napoleon, if the Germans had had Rommel instead of Hitler, if the French hadn't relied on WW1 thinking with the Maginot Line....in the end, Britain and France combined were always going to have trouble holding Germany.

It's true that there's something in the British psyche that I don't like, namely this apparent need to take a good pasting before we win. It's almost as though we don't feel that we're entitled to win until we've been though the fire. Those George Formby films in which George - nice, brave but stupid - finally triumphs, sum it up.

Yes, but those George Formby films are still entertaining. I did not know there is a "Ukelele Hall of Fame" and Formby (of course) is in it - see his "Wikipedia article", which states his playing style was quite unique.

The German flanking of the Maginot Line certainly is important, but what I think really collapsed the French in June 1940 was a question of government morale. The Third Republic had always been splintered by all kinds of rival political groups and philosophies, and became even more so in the 1930s. This is why the only stable Third Republic regimes were three, one under Jules Ferry in the 1880s that lasted about a year and a half, and two under Georges Clemenceau in the first decade of the 20th Century, and the one during the last part of World War I. A typical French government lasted between three and seven months. Even when Britain had coalitions (like in World War I) they were pretty stable, and the splintering effects were rarities (like in the 1880s and again in 1923-24). In 1931 Britain's Labour, Tory, and some Liberals form the National Government and it stays in office until 1935 - hardly like that in France. The U.S. could have a Democrat like Wilson facing a Republican Congress (1919-1921), but the framework of term limits kept the governments in place.

France by June 1940 had openly pro-Nazi groups on the right seeking to join forces with Hitler. These, of course, would be the backbone of the later Vichy Regime. They certainly did not help the French armies (no matter how bravely they fought) in stopping the Nazi advance.

Jeff