Ex-Nazi "Bookkeeper of Auschwitz" Asks for 'Forgiveness'

[Limehouse]

It's not nearly as 'silly' as you seem to think.

Were the English really so well equipped for war once professional outfits such as Germany and the United States started throwing an inordinate level of resources into it?

We always had a small standing army. Highly trained, granted, but nowhere near what was needed to compete once war became much more professional in its scope. Largely, this was down to the English people who could stomach a navy that to them would guarantee their peaceful existence, but could not stomach the funding of a large standing army.

Why this constant reference to 'English' and 'England'? We fought the war as the British nation and, let's not forget, a good number of our citizens in the Empire fought with us and lost their lives as a result.

[Robert]

Fleetwood, while it's true that as time went on the 'Big Two' tended to make the decisions, I think you underestimate the pull we had on the Americans. For instance, we got them to prioritise the war with Germany, when they really wanted to get at Japan. And, being Americans, they wanted an early Second Front - 1942, certainly 1943. We weren't ready, the Americans weren't ready, and so they had to wait.

As for France, we can go on all day with 'ifs' - if the British had had Marlborough, if the French had had Napoleon, if the Germans had had Rommel instead of Hitler, if the French hadn't relied on WW1 thinking with the Maginot Line....in the end, Britain and France combined were always going to have trouble holding Germany.

It's true that there's something in the British psyche that I don't like, namely this apparent need to take a good pasting before we win. It's almost as though we don't feel that we're entitled to win until we've been though the fire. Those George Formby films in which George - nice, brave but stupid - finally triumphs, sum it up.

[Graham]

Good post, Robert. It does tend to be forgotten (on both sides of the pond) that it was the British Purchasing Commission that kick-started American industry into wartime mode.

It so happens I'm currently reading the book "Ian Fleming's Commandos" by Nicholas Rankin, and it's interesting how much serious effort the Brits put into matching (and often improving upon) German military technology without much help from the Americans in the early years of the war. Plus of course the breaking of the Enigma codes with initial help from the French and Poles.

Graham

[Mayerling]

Fleetwood, while it's true that as time went on the 'Big Two' tended to make the decisions, I think you underestimate the pull we had on the Americans. For instance, we got them to prioritise the war with Germany, when they really wanted to get at Japan. And, being Americans, they wanted an early Second Front - 1942, certainly 1943. We weren't ready, the Americans weren't ready, and so they had to wait.

As for France, we can go on all day with 'ifs' - if the British had had Marlborough, if the French had had Napoleon, if the Germans had had Rommel instead of Hitler, if the French hadn't relied on WW1 thinking with the Maginot Line....in the end, Britain and France combined were always going to have trouble holding Germany.

It's true that there's something in the British psyche that I don't like, namely this apparent need to take a good pasting before we win. It's almost as though we don't feel that we're entitled to win until we've been though the fire. Those George Formby films in which George - nice, brave but stupid - finally triumphs, sum it up.

Yes, but those George Formby films are still entertaining. I did not know there is a "Ukelele Hall of Fame" and Formby (of course) is in it - see his "Wikipedia article", which states his playing style was quite unique.

The German flanking of the Maginot Line certainly is important, but what I think really collapsed the French in June 1940 was a question of government morale. The Third Republic had always been splintered by all kinds of rival political groups and philosophies, and became even more so in the 1930s. This is why the only stable Third Republic regimes were three, one under Jules Ferry in the 1880s that lasted about a year and a half, and two under Georges Clemenceau in the first decade of the 20th Century, and the one during the last part of World War I. A typical French government lasted between three and seven months. Even when Britain had coalitions (like in World War I) they were pretty stable, and the splintering effects were rarities (like in the 1880s and again in 1923-24). In 1931 Britain's Labour, Tory, and some Liberals form the National Government and it stays in office until 1935 - hardly like that in France. The U.S. could have a Democrat like Wilson facing a Republican Congress (1919-1921), but the framework of term limits kept the governments in place.

France by June 1940 had openly pro-Nazi groups on the right seeking to join forces with Hitler. These, of course, would be the backbone of the later Vichy Regime. They certainly did not help the French armies (no matter how bravely they fought) in stopping the Nazi advance.

Jeff

[Robert]

Hi Jeff

Yes, the French were terribly divided. Theoretically the Germans should have been just as divided but Nazi brutality at home, and foreign policy successes abroad, quietened most of the opposition.

[Mayerling]

Hi Robert,

Yeah, there is nothing like iron-boot terror tactics on one's own population to bring a great deal of silent dread to the opposition. Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin all knew this, as did the Japanese militarists.

A comment you made earlier about what F.D.R. labelled as "iffy history" (yes, it's his term!) is true - one can do the Monday quarterback approach, but all historical analysis is that. I was a history major in college, and one of the courses that is required is "historiography". This is actually a course on the different styles of writing history up to the present and how each is valuable for interpretations, but each is always flawed. That's why we constantly get new books on old subjects, usually on an anniversary of an important date. The flaw is built in: the writer of history is going to take into the writing of the subject not only his or her research, but the point of view that has been put into the writer by the time of the writer's own life. An example of this: the classic history of England by Thomas Macauley. It is still quite worth reading, but nowadays we tend to question the "Whig" school of thinking that Macauley championed. He did not question the "Glorious Revolution" and it's aftermath because of how he saw the events of English history from 1670 to 1689. He saw a tamping down on English liberty of thought in the reign of James II and the tyranny of that monarch's government in putting down Monmouth's Rebellion with the "Bloody Assizes" of Judge Jeffreys.

No denying this is true, and one credits Macauley with severely questioning the character of certain parties (the young and up-and-coming John Churchill, for example, whom Macauley rightly considers an opportunist). But given the anti-Catholicism in England that faced the Roman Catholic James, can one seriously blame him for his policy blunders? Judge Jeffreys and Judge Scroggs may be blots on jurisprudence, but is that pillar of Protestantism Titus Oates any better? Again to his credit Macauley called a spade a spade and detested Oates and other informers of the period, swearing away the lives of people.

Well, the point is (and sorry for diverting a 20th Century discussion to the 17th Century for a moment) interpretation is going to change, and we will are not at the end of it. Hence our embracing those "iffy" history points, no matter how seemingly useless they are in the final analysis. The Armada was defeated in 1588. Booth did not fail at Ford's Theatre 150 years ago last week. The Lusitania did land at the bottom of the Irish Sea 100 years ago next month.

My own personal view of the events for 1938-1945 are intensely aggrevated by what happened to millions of innocent lives due to a handful of intensely evil men (and I refer to Nazis, though I can consider Stalinist Communists as bad, and note "questionable" moves and policies of people supposedly more decent). If I could rewrite history - Chamberlain would have had more common sense and backbone at Munich, walked out with Deladier, and within a few weeks the Czech air force would have been laying waste to Dresden, Hamburg, Frankfort, and Munich itself far ahead of schedule. Then perhaps that silenced opposition in Germany would have roused itself to lynch it's Chancelor and his minions. Of course the problem is, it might have roused itself to support a war effort against Czechoslovakia.

Jeff

[Robert]

Hi Jeff

Yes it's true that each generation will offer a new interpretation, which is a good thing. I suppose that historians are like philosophers - they have to re-construct their boat - on the open sea!

For my part I would have thrown the Germans out of the Rhineland in 1936.

And of course some quite ordinary things should have been done, such as locking up Hitler for a good long stretch after 1923 - but that was the Germans' fault.

[Fleetwood Mac]

If I could rewrite history - Chamberlain would have had more common sense and backbone at Munich

Except Chamberlain had no less backbone than anyone else.

What Chamberlain did was a continuation of British foreign policy not a change.

It had always been felt that continental Europe was a place full of trouble, and in the event they want to kill one another then **** 'em, get on with it, we have commercial interests elsewhere.

There was only one time in the entire history of England that we sent an army to continental Europe at the outbreak of war and that was WW1, a grave mistake. Every other time we only got involved when one party was threatening to dominant the continent, e.g. Napoleon.

Chamberlain's policies were typically English, and the vast majority of people had no problem with Germans in one country, or Germans taking back the Rhineland. It was theirs. It's called respecting sovereignty.

What really boils my piss is the idiot tories and liberals ruined this country for their own ill-conceived goals, but Chamberlain, and I'm no tory, did the right thing. Their country; their business.

[Robert]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

Chamberlain was in Munich doing what we'd always done. Granting the odd concession while aiming to keep the lid on instability. We'd done this for centuries and it worked.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Interesting, Fleetwood. One wonders what Chamberlain was doing in Munich at all, if he felt it was none of his business. Was he on holiday? Or had he caught the wrong train?

He wouldn't by any chance have been there in order to twist the Czechs' arm and tell them they were a threat to peace, would he?

It's a pity you weren't around in 1919, Fleetwood. You could have told the British not to go to the peace conference, since it was no concern of ours, especially if we had not the slightest intention of seeing that the treaty's terms were actually carried out. At least it would have saved the taxpayer some money on the banquets.

As it happens, Robert, there's no use in a passive aggressive stance with me. You'd be much better served by reading about these things.

Britain was at the peace treaty to serve our interests, and it was felt that our interest was not in following the French line of trying to ruin Germany forever, nor the American line of attempting to extract an impossible amount of money from Germany.

Quite simple really, when you pick up a book.

[Robert]

Sorry, Fleetwood, but you still haven't explained what Chamberlain was doing at Munich. Keeping the lid on instability? You mean like when a guy goes into a bank and says "Help keep the lid on instability by giving me all the money - because if you don't, I will shoot you"?

[Fleetwood Mac]

Sorry, Fleetwood, but you still haven't explained what Chamberlain was doing at Munich. Keeping the lid on instability? You mean like when a guy goes into a bank and says "Help keep the lid on instability by giving me all the money - because if you don't, I will shoot you"?

I did explain it, but you missed the point.

I would have thought the Pax Britannica didn't need an introduction.

[Mayerling]

As it happens, Robert, there's no use in a passive aggressive stance with me. You'd be much better served by reading about these things.

Britain was at the peace treaty to serve our interests, and it was felt that our interest was not in following the French line of trying to ruin Germany forever, nor the American line of attempting to extract an impossible amount of money from Germany.

Quite simple really, when you pick up a book.

Hi Fleetwood,

I'm just trying to fit things together here regarding 1918-1919. From what you are saying the Lloyd George government was only trying to maintain British interests at Versailles. But his "Khaki Election" Campaign (1918) had a slogan - "Squeezing Germany until the pips squeak!" or something to that affect. At least that is what I understood. If that is correct, the British delegation was actually also looking for some restitution (financial or material) from Germany. In fact, the U.S. was (again my understanding of this) rather restrained at this point about restitution. We did pursue Germany in the law courts over acts of sabotage (the "Black Tom Island" incident in 1916), but I can't recall a determination to actually demand huge financial payments from Germany. In fact, later on we created two separate if somewhat inadequate financing plans to assist the Germans in paying off British and French demands.* And Britain and France actually tried to encourage us to pick up mandates in the Middle East like Lebanon and Palestine (which the Wilson administration wisely refused to consider).

[*The second was the "Dawes Plan". I can't recall the first one.]

If I am wrong please clear it up to me

Jeff

[Mayerling]

Except Chamberlain had no less backbone than anyone else.

What Chamberlain did was a continuation of British foreign policy not a change.

It had always been felt that continental Europe was a place full of trouble, and in the event they want to kill one another then **** 'em, get on with it, we have commercial interests elsewhere.

There was only one time in the entire history of England that we sent an army to continental Europe at the outbreak of war and that was WW1, a grave mistake. Every other time we only got involved when one party was threatening to dominant the continent, e.g. Napoleon.

Chamberlain's policies were typically English, and the vast majority of people had no problem with Germans in one country, or Germans taking back the Rhineland. It was theirs. It's called respecting sovereignty.

What really boils my piss is the idiot tories and liberals ruined this country for their own ill-conceived goals, but Chamberlain, and I'm no tory, did the right thing. Their country; their business.

Sorry but I was considering the statement that when England sent the army to the continent in August 1914 it was a grave mistake. I'm not sure the Asquith government could have sat it out and watched, because the declaration of war in August 1914 against Germany was pegged not on the Balkan business at Sarajevo, but German violation of Belgian neutrality, which was horse of a different color. I don't think any British government could have ignored it.

I will grant you this - by sending that force to the Continent, supposedly to help Belgium due to the invasion, and to keep in touch with the Entente Cordial with France, Asquith and his cabinet would have also been aware that in the wake of the Curragh fiasco in Ireland such a foreign intervention would cover over the government's embarrassment, and the possibly treasonous behavior of the military leadership by giving them another target to set their eyes on. In that case I have to really wonder about the Belgian intervention.

Jeff

Boy this is getting complex!