Happy "We Beat British Butt" Day!

[Cogidubnus]

So if he isn't an enemy in 1939 how does he threaten our trade routes...I'm afraid you've just contradicted one of your own arguments...

All the best

Dave

[Fleetwood Mac]

So if he isn't an enemy in 1939 how does he threaten our trade routes...I'm afraid you've just contradicted one of your own arguments...

All the best

Dave

I think you're misunderstanding what I'm saying, Dave.

German intentions towards Britain and her threat to our interests were open to debate. As such, there was a discussion to be had around the threat Germany posed to us and the options we had based upon the perceived threat. My initial post stated we had options; you're reply stated we didn't.

Popular history suggests Germany was an unstoppable force hell-bent on world domination; the records suggest otherwise.

The French had superior technology in some areas. They made two monumental errors of judgement. Firstly, they built the Maginot Line which meant they went into the war with a defensive mindset and the thing wasn't finished and so the Germans simply marched round it. Secondly, it was believed that the Ardennes was impassable. When the first German columns appeared out of the Ardennes French commanders didn't believe it and wasted precious time when the gap could have been closed. Instead, the French and British armies had merrily advanced into Belguim and by the time they realised the Germans really were out of the Ardennes and behind them it was too late. It threw the French and British armies into disarray.

You see, at no point in England was it felt that the Germans would so comprehensively defeat the French, but planners didn't account for poor planning on the part of the French and the mindset in which the French entered the war.

Also, whether or not the Germans had any wish to eat into our commercial interests really is open to debate, and it is on record that the Germans were happy for us to dominate the seas while they dominated Central and Eastern Europe. The war with France was a defensive war to prevent a war on two fronts; the aim being to knock the French out of the war so that they could get down to business.

Ultimately the decision taken by the British Government was that German control of North West France was too much of a risk to take, but this wasn't the only horse in the race.

[Cogidubnus]

whether or not the Germans had any wish to eat into our commercial interests really is open to debate, and it is on record that the Germans were happy for us to dominate the seas while they dominated Central and Eastern Europe. The war with France was a defensive war to prevent a war on two fronts; the aim being to knock the French out of the war so that they could get down to business.

versus

We only ever got involved when our trade routes were threatened.

With respect, no I don't think I'm misunderstanding at all...

You see, at no point in England was it felt that the Germans would so comprehensively defeat the French, but planners didn't account for poor planning on the part of the French and the mindset in which the French entered the war.

That being so clearly the case are you arguing we should have just left it to the French and woken up ten, fifteen or twenty years on with a powerful and far more consolidated enemy crossing the channel? In those circumstances it might've been more prudent to start rearming far sooner, (not to mention not "standing down the troops" in 1938!). Do you really think that was an option?

German intentions towards Britain and her threat to our interests were open to debate. As such, there was a discussion to be had around the threat Germany posed to us and the options we had based upon the perceived threat. My initial post stated we had options;

I agree peaceful overtures were made...but be honest...Austria was a sovereign nation in it's own right, guaranteed it's existence by the Treaty of Versailles...Anschluss.......Germany was at peace with the Czechs until the disgrace of the Sudedenland...and then just after Hitler stated he had no further territorial ambitions he was at peace with Poland too...how would you have read the tealeaves?

The reality of course is that Britain wasn't bent on war, and probably did far to much down the years to appease Hitler in the very hope of avoiding war...Britain's relative unreadiness for war show very clearly how much the lessons of 1918 had been learned. Hitler made war inevitable; the only question really was how soon...

All the best

Dave

[Cogidubnus]

Anyway, I've said my piece and really don't want to fall out with anyone, so I'll back out of this one!

All the very best

Dave

[Fleetwood Mac]

With respect, no I don't think I'm misunderstanding at all...

I'll rephrase it.

We only ever got involved with continental European wars when we perceived our trade routes were threatened. This in turn is influenced by how much you stand to lose in the event there are designs on your treasure.

When the decision was taken to declare war on Germany, there was nothing in German policy that suggested a challenge to our position.

It boiled down to a theoretical scenario.

Would the Germans defeat the French? Not guaranteed at all.

In the event they did defeat the French, then what would this mean for our commerce?

These were questions that had to be asked prior to any decision, and the scenarios/eventualities/options had to be considered.

It was equally viable that the French would have held them, and even more viable that the Gemans would have concentrated their efforts in the East in terms of plunder: not on British interests.

The Government of the day decided that there may not have been any threat to our interests, but Britain couldn't afford to take the risk that there was.

We weighed up the options and arrived at the conclusion that there is one thing we just can't risk here, and that is German control of North West France and the possibility that they'd use that to damage our commercial interests. This was one possible scenario of many. We could just have easily taken the decision that German interests lay to the East and as such we have nothing to gain from entering the war.

Is this clearer?

[Limehouse]

It was over anyway. We're a small country off the North West coast of Europe. It was never going to last. I think it is a credit to England (assuming you like empire and that kind of thing) that we managed to achieve what we did and leave a lasting legacy on the world.

The world would be a very different place had the English idea of commerce and liberal democracy not triumphed over ideas from other countries.

Just England? I think you will find the Scottish, Welsh and Irish also played an important part, not to mention our brothers and sisters in other parts of the Empire.

[Barnaby]

I'm surprised no one has questioned the patriotic allegiances of the Ripper by this point...

[Mayerling]

Hi Fleetwood,

I have been following what you have been saying, and mostly agree with it - but I have a few points I disagree with.

Earlier you mentioned the lack of interest in Belgium in 1914. Actually this is not true. Belgium had been on the minds of the British since 1839, when it's independence from it's neighbors was guarranteed to the point that every signatory agreed not to invade it. This was the "scrap of paper" that Bethmann-Holweg mentioned in his dismissal of the neutrality of Belgium. Britain retained a real interest, especially as the royal family was related to the reigning family of Belgium (also Saxe-Coburg). The British had revealled the "Congo Cruelties" of King Leopold II and Henry Morton Stanley in the first decade of the 20th Century. Leopold was dead, and his more realistic and decent nephew Albert reigned.

Why Britain was interested in Belgian neutrality was simple - the coast of Belgium was a perfect springboard into the channel and an attack on England. That was why (in August 1914) the invasion of Belgium really caused the British to formally join with the titular allies of the two Entente's, France and Russia. If Wilhelm and his advisors had not used the Schleiffen Plan, calling for an invasion of Belgium for a pincer movement into France, Britain would have stayed out - it couldn't have cared less for Serbian's existance (in fact, British disapproval of the same gang of Serbian nationalists who killed Franz Ferdinand and his Sophie at Sarajevo, stretched back to when they slaughtered King Alexander of Serbia and his wife Queen Draga (and her brothers) in Belgrade in 1903). To this day I have wondered why the Kaiser did not order the use of the Kiel Canal to send transports to the coast of France to bypass Belgium. It would have been smarter.

Jeff

[RivkahChaya]

You know, technically, July 4th, 1776, wasn't "We kicked British butt day," so much as "We're not going to let our butts be kicked by the British-- please. We hope." And then we got lucky, and a lot of that whole "people fight harder for their homes than for a principle" thing. The Revolutionary War peace treaty wasn't signed until 1883.

Now that I think about it, from the British perspective, a war with their own colonies sort of meant they were supplying both sides (yes, I know the French were fortifying the colonies). But the war involved destroying a lot of infrastructure, and the colonists were using "domestic resources" to fight back, so it really wasn't worth winning, because if the British did get the colonists to surrender, the crown would then be responsible for rebuilding a depleted area, and the whole point of colonies was for them to be resources, not drains on the economy.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Hi Fleetwood,

I have been following what you have been saying, and mostly agree with it - but I have a few points I disagree with.

Earlier you mentioned the lack of interest in Belgium in 1914. Actually this is not true. Belgium had been on the minds of the British since 1839, when it's independence from it's neighbors was guarranteed to the point that every signatory agreed not to invade it. This was the "scrap of paper" that Bethmann-Holweg mentioned in his dismissal of the neutrality of Belgium. Britain retained a real interest, especially as the royal family was related to the reigning family of Belgium (also Saxe-Coburg). The British had revealled the "Congo Cruelties" of King Leopold II and Henry Morton Stanley in the first decade of the 20th Century. Leopold was dead, and his more realistic and decent nephew Albert reigned.

Why Britain was interested in Belgian neutrality was simple - the coast of Belgium was a perfect springboard into the channel and an attack on England. That was why (in August 1914) the invasion of Belgium really caused the British to formally join with the titular allies of the two Entente's, France and Russia. If Wilhelm and his advisors had not used the Schleiffen Plan, calling for an invasion of Belgium for a pincer movement into France, Britain would have stayed out - it couldn't have cared less for Serbian's existance (in fact, British disapproval of the same gang of Serbian nationalists who killed Franz Ferdinand and his Sophie at Sarajevo, stretched back to when they slaughtered King Alexander of Serbia and his wife Queen Draga (and her brothers) in Belgrade in 1903). To this day I have wondered why the Kaiser did not order the use of the Kiel Canal to send transports to the coast of France to bypass Belgium. It would have been smarter.

Jeff

Hello Jeff,

Thanks for your info on the US Travel thread, by the way.

I can't agree on your Belguim point.

The British Government could not have cared less about the people of Belguim or any other people in the world. Not an unusual stance to take, because, after all, foreign policy is dictated by self-interest all over the world.

The Monarchy had absolutely no say in British politics. This issue was resolved in the 1600s when Parliament firmly put the Monarchy in their place, and since that time the Monarchy have been told to stay out of politics whenever they've attempted to cross the line. Even today, when Prince Charles gets involved in political issues he is firmly reminded of the Monarchy's role in Britain - and it ain't politics.

Also, the Monarchy had a bond with Germany. It was only 30 years prior to 1914 that Queen Victoria stated she was German at heart. Her family spoke German behind closed doors.

The real issues with Belguim were: 1) it was the main route to invade France 2) British honour.

There were other issues, such as Britain and France, the oldest of enemies, arrived at a nice little set up in the 1890s whereby we agreed who would have which colonial posessions. It worked for both countries and we were happy to split the proceeds. Because this worked,i.e. two powers able to work with one
another, then why risk Germany coming along and upsetting the apple-cart.

The Germans attempted to negotiate with Britain by suggesting that they would invade merely a small strip of Belguim and guarantee the remainder of the country's sovereignty. This was of no use to Britain.

Right up to the eve of declaring war, the Government was split between those who wanted nothing to do with it and those who felt we should enter the war. At no point had the British Government said Yes to France or anyone else, but at the same time had told German delegates that they shouldn't expect Britain to stay out of the war in the event they invaded France. It was a tactic aimed at disincentivising both parties to instigate a war. Except Britain only had a small standing army so no one was sure whether or not Britain could even influence a war on the European continent. Some members of the cabinet resigned when they realised the decision was going t be to go to war, but it was only really swung by the fact that the main members of the cabinet agitating for war shouted the loudest and were able to convince the waverers.

I don't think the Germans used the Schleiffen plan in the end, Jeff. It was a watered down version pre-empted by the Russians mobilising much quicker than the Germans thought possible and marching into Germany.

My pesonal opinion is that in the event the Germans had not invaded Belguim, the British would have declared war on Germany, because the whole point of British diplomacy was to maintain a balance of power in continental Europe; and it was felt the Germans would have too much for both the French and the Russians.

Either way, it's a very interesting period in history.

[Fleetwood Mac]

You know, technically, July 4th, 1776, wasn't "We kicked British butt day," so much as "We're not going to let our butts be kicked by the British-- please. We hope." And then we got lucky, and a lot of that whole "people fight harder for their homes than for a principle" thing. The Revolutionary War peace treaty wasn't signed until 1883.

Now that I think about it, from the British perspective, a war with their own colonies sort of meant they were supplying both sides (yes, I know the French were fortifying the colonies). But the war involved destroying a lot of infrastructure, and the colonists were using "domestic resources" to fight back, so it really wasn't worth winning, because if the British did get the colonists to surrender, the crown would then be responsible for rebuilding a depleted area, and the whole point of colonies was for them to be resources, not drains on the economy.

I'm far from an expert in this period of history, but my basic understanding is that Britain was virtually bankrupt around this time. I think it's fair to say that the British Government had priorities elsewhere, as shown by the token force they made available for this expedition when compared with the force put out to tackle Napoleon.

Also, within Britain's Parliament there were advocates for the colonists' self-determination, e.g. Edmund Burke and associates.

Either way, it was the right outcome as it gave a tyrannical government hell bent on taxing the living daylights out of people a bloody nose - and that can only be a good thing - doesn't matter which countries are involved.

[Mayerling]

Hi Fleetwood,

Glad to be of any help on that vacation of yours - enjoy yourselves.

Actually in thinking it over it's rather nervy on my part to discuss my interpretation of British diplomatic moves vis-a-vis other countries. Although I have some English blood in my family (my maternal grandmother's father was from Birmingham), having grown up in the U.S. I really see things through our frequently too rose-colored glasses. You, being from England, actually would have a better grasp on the normal trend of your country's foreign policies.

So I will say (not in patronizing manner at all) that you are basically right on the issues of summer 1914. Still I think the Germans would have been wiser to have used troop transports through the Kiel Canal to the coast of France.

They did use a watered down Schlieffen plan - Von Moltke the 2nd kept changing it, not realizing that on of the arms of the pincer was supposed to be weaker than the other as a lure for the French (he worried about this and increased the size of the weaker arm, thus helping to ruin the plan). The plan did have it's own time-table defect, though unexpected: it underestimated Tsarist Russia's ability to attack in the east after mobilization. It turned out the Russians could attack faster than Von Schlieffen anticipated - so that Moltke had to send valuable troops back to Germany to protect East Prussia. This lead to the victory at Tannenburg over the Russians, and the creation of Germany's premier army leadership team, Von Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

As for the "lesson" taught the Royal Family after the execution of Charles I, as late as 1834 the King of England (William IV - "Silly Billy" or the "Sailor King" as he is recalled) actually was still trying to hold onto Royal power perogatives, dismissing Lord Melbourne's government and trying to return the Tories under Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington. It didn't work too well, lasting about four months or so, before William had to recall Melbourne, who remained his Prime Minister until the end of his reign.

Jeff