The Fog Of War

[Mayerling]

I did not find any unwillingness for McClellan to seek a "gentleman's peace" with the Confederate leadership - he certainly would have preferred it to the refusal of Lincoln to consider anything but total acceptance of reunification. The fly in the ointment with this theory was what happened in 1864 when McClellan got the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. He had a platform that the Copperheads (Vallandigham, Wood, etc.) hammered together which declared the war a failure and desired peace at any price as soon as possible. McClellan hemmed and hawed for a few days over this, but he refused to endorse the peace plank - he felt it would be a slap in the face towards the men who had served underneath him in the war.

In a way his refusal to commit for a full victory against Lee reminds one of an earlier problem general -Sir William Howe, who several times in the campaigns against Washington in New York and Pennsylvania could have smashed the American Revolution but seemed to restrain that last bit of effort that would have crowned his victories with ending the war. Howe and his brother, Admiral Lord Richard Howe, were also given powers to try to negotiate a peace with the Americans, and actually met with John Adams and Benjamin Franklin on Staten Island in 1776. McClellan never had any similar attempt to meet with Lee (I can't see Lee being willing to conduct such a meeting) but at one point after the battle of Malvern Hill (at the end of the Seven Days battle, McClellan sent Lincoln an unwanted letter of advice on how to end the war.

Jeff

[Phil H]

To what extent do you think McC had a "political" agenda in his campaign strategy.

I cannot help but feel he did not want a decisive win over the Confederacy. As a Democrat he wanted the South re-integrated into the union pretty much as it was ante-bellum, with slavery intact.

A big win would mean Lincoln and the Republicans could dictate terms.

Hence - in part - his slowness on the peninsula and at Antietam.

Combined maybe with a distate for battle itself - I don't know whether he was a physical coward to any extent. However, when you compare him to generals like Scott Hancock or Reynolds, he certainly did not lead from the front.

Certainly not a battlefield commander.

Phil

[Cogidubnus]

Hi Jeff

Thank you...that's much appreciated...will go back and re-read with the points you make in mind...

All the best

Dave

[Mayerling]

Antietam is my next project - I see many parallels to Gettysburg, which is not geopgraphically that far away. So any discussion of that is hugely welcome, though I am a novice on that battle.

I'd also be interested in people's thoughts and ideas on that "Young Napoleon" George B McClellan. A brilliant organiser it seems, inspirational but a deeply flawed field commander and a man with almost fatal personal weaknesses and blindspots for them.

Phil

Good old "MacNapoleon".

I spent a year researching the man and that year and a half where he was the center of the North's War effort in the east. He came from a good family - his father (also George McClellan) founded the Jefferson Medical School in Philadelphia. He was a good student at West Point (second in his class at graduation). Performed well in the Mexican War. Sent as one of a group of observers to the Crimea and Russia in 1855. He also worked under Col. Randolph Marcy (his father-in-law) in the Red River area of Texas on a
mapping expedition that went well. Finally he was President of the Illinois Central Railroad (unfortunately he did not like their best attorney - Abraham Lincoln).

He performed nicely indeed in the West Virginia Campaign of 1861 at Philippi and Rich Mountain. In my studies of that campaign I noticed his performance there was partly due to the full level of support he got from Governor Dennison of Ohio. This is important because it is a key to what later went awry in the Peninsula and Seven Days and at Antietam Creek. There he was certain he could not lack full support by the Federal Government - in fact he had been humiliated when they took most of his troops away and given them to John Pope, and he was only reinstated when Pope flopped miserably at Second Bull Run. That his lack of respect for Lincoln undermined that relationship, and his total misjudgment about Edward Stanton, caused this never appears to have occurred to him.

I concluded that he was a brilliant organizer, and a gifted strategist, but (at best) a mediocre tactician, and his egotism and paranoia ruined his chances. Even so, he did prove to be enough to give Lee a hard fight - with all his flaws. Lee made a jocular comment that one day they might replace McClellan with a general who he did not understand as well (which they finally did first with Meade, then with Grant). But he admitted that McClellan was the best of the generals in command up to Gettysburg (a quote in two sources that is always misunderstood).

Jeff

[Phil H]

Thanks, Steve

That gives me a better mental impression than any book I have read. Much appreciated.

Phil

[Steve S]

Cemetery...Not steep,but gradual...I walked Pickett's route,and certainly knew it was up hill....But I was a 50-year old fat English guy at the time.....On Culp's etc...Well,they're not the virtual mountains some sources imply,but enough to make them highly defendable.....Over the years,my own re-enactment experiences have shown me how even a slight rise can affect morale tremendously,without even mentioning the practical effects of holding the High ground..........

[Phil H]

On Gettysburg - as an Englishman unable (at the moment) to get to Gettysburg itself - can someone who has been there please tell me:

a) how steep are the slopes of Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill south of the town - the front on which Ewell would have to have attacked; and

B) how steep is the slope of Cemetery Ridge, towards which Pickett and others marched; and down which Dan Sickles advanced?

Antietam is my next project - I see many parallels to Gettysburg, which is not geopgraphically that far away. So any discussion of that is hugely welcome, though I am a novice on that battle.

I'd also be interested in people's thoughts and ideas on that "Young Napoleon" George B McClellan. A brilliant organiser it seems, inspirational but a deeply flawed field commander and a man with almost fatal personal weaknesses and blindspots for them.

Phil

[Steve S]

I'd like to have had the Night of the Long Knives one.

They were a good series - sensible, well written, accessible. Nothing much like them now. The Osprey series are different in tone and aim, I think.

Phil

Osprey are aimed more at Wargamers,Re-Enactors.Modellers IMHO........

[Steve S]

Our trip took us to Gettysburg,Bull Run, Richmond and Appomattox...and a few 17th/18th cent sites.......On Gettysburg in particular,I guess it all depends on what you read in what order,(bit like Ripper suspects...) The point about Early is a very valid one..Ewell's Eminence Grise......MAYBE, The best thing Lee could have done was disengage as soon as was was aware Federal infantry were present in strength............?

[Mayerling]

Can I put in please a (slightly out of sequence I know - sorry Scorpio) request, that when you've finished debating Gettysburg, you devote some time please to Antietam...You see, for some reason, years ago I took a bit of an interest in this particular confrontation, and concluded that the whole murderous second day simply shouldn't have happened...that the outcome should've seemed obvious...

Thanks

Dave

Hi Dave,

I did a history honors thesis at my college on McClellan's Civil War career, so I had to go over Antietam Creek. It's a one day murder fest between two armies, arguably with Lee's Army of Northen Virginia at it's peak. McClellan certainly did not show any great tactical improvement, using peacemeal corps attacks that almost destroy Lee, only to have Jackson and A. P. Hill turn up and save the day. But Lee again shows certain deficiencies in this first invasion campaign (the most famous in not insisting that his orders to his subordinates - "Hello D. H. Hill" - are kept in safe places).

Lee surveyed the battlefield the night of the battle with Jackson, and (despite the bloodiness of the affair) was seriously considering renewing the entire battle. Jackson, aware that now all the Confederate forces were exhausted, just managed to convince Lee that they had to be resigned that they could not do it and they had to retreat to Virginia a failure. Lee did so (albeit reluctantly). I'm of the opinions that Jackson was wiser here - renewed attack with Southern troops (and no reinforcements really available now) would have been finally enough for McClellan to send in Franklin's troops to repel and fight back (they had been saved). It would have been worse than the one day stalemate - bloodbath - it would possibly have been "Little Mac" 's first real victory since the West Virginia campaign. That does not mean it would have ended the war - McClellan would probably have not pursued shattered forces (I know my McClellan).

Jeff

[Cogidubnus]

This is fascinating stuff...for myself I'm really gaining some insights into a period which has fascinated me almost since childhood (stimulated doubtless by an awful series of chewing gum cards!)...

Can I put in please a (slightly out of sequence I know - sorry Scorpio) request, that when you've finished debating Gettysburg, you devote some time please to Antietam...You see, for some reason, years ago I took a bit of an interest in this particular confrontation, and concluded that the whole murderous second day simply shouldn't have happened...that the outcome should've seemed obvious...

Yet a while back, when I expressed this view I was leapt on from a great height, mostly by folk whose knowledge is a great deal superior to my own...for which reason I'd love to hear the experts "take" on this battle

Anyway, for now, back to Gettysburg

Thanks

Dave

[Phil H]

Steve

I put a lot down to Ewell's "sluggishness" on the first day..Lee shouldn't have to tell him seizing the high ground would be a good thing. ...

I agree.

But Ewell was new to Corps command and less accustomed to discrentionary orders. Jackson never let his subordinates have "discretion" for heaven's sake - he TOLD then what to do.

After the war Ewell (like Lee) maintained a dignified silence. Most of what we know of him at Gettysburg comes from Trimble and early (both of whom had post-war axes to grind!).

On the whole I think his decision not to try to take the Hills south of Gettysburg during the evening of 1 July, the right one. I say that, given that Lee provided him no support, no fresh troops - albeit Anderson's untouched division (Hill's Corps) was close by - and Longstreet's utter lack of enthusiasm. Lee failed even to provide artillery support on Seminary Ridge where there were good positions, while there were none on Ewell's front. If the rest of the ANV would not support him, why should Dick Ewell take all the blame?

A topic for discussion might be Ewell's reliance on Jubal Early though.

People say Jackson might have taken the Hills, but by 4.30, when the Union line collapsed, the town was in chaos, the Confederate troops were disorganised and there were prisoners to take care of in large numbers. A hot pursuit might have caused the Union forces a problem, but Hancock and Howard had many guns and a whole unused brigade in position to resist. So I think even Stonewall might have been repulsed.

Lee's man-management also leaves something to be desired, in my view. He changed his plans about three times on the evening of 1 July. He must have noticed that Hill was unwell and not in control, yet he did nothing. If Ewell was not aggressive enough, why not go and stiffen his backbone in person? - yet Lee goes over for a leisurely conference about his intentions for the next day!

Yet all that said, Day 1 had been a huge success for the ANV - two whole AoP Corps mauled and routed. This was what Lee had hoped for and if Meade had fallen back to say the Pipe Creek Line rather than standing at Gettysburg, the 1 July would have been celebrated as a significant Confederate success, I believe.

Then Lee routs two more Union Corps on 2 July!!! The recent book by Guelzo suggests that Meade did come close to pulling out on 2 July - again, if he had, how different history might have been.

Phil

[Mayerling]

I recall once reading a book that suggested looking at Lee's battles up to Gettysburg as equations with himself and the Army of Northern Virginia as a
"7" and a "4" or "11". and the North as fielding the Army of the Potomac (a "6") with the various commanders never rising above a "5" for McClellan before 1862, but that the balance of the equation collapsed at Gettysburg because the Army of the Potomac was now (due to reforms by Hooker) an "8", and Meade was a "5" like Little Mac had been. The author of this book suggested the key to the change was the quality of the Northern generals and officers had vastly improved (as did the cavalry) with few exceptions (i.e., Sickels), and that most knew what to do in emergencies that previously would have flummoxed their reactions. Not a fool proof explanation but an interesting one.

Jeff

[Phil H]

I'd like to have had the Night of the Long Knives one.

They were a good series - sensible, well written, accessible. Nothing much like them now. The Osprey series are different in tone and aim, I think.

Phil

[Mayerling]

I think they may have been an offshoot of the partwork: HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (published by Purnell in the UK) which I collected in the mid 60s.

I have put my hand on one of the volumes to which I think you maybe referring "Hitler", published as The Pan/Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II (War Leader Book No 1). It is edited by Barrie Pitt and says it was first published in the USA 1970. I also have volumes on the London Blitz, the Nuremburg Rallies, and one I think on WWI (Carpathian Disaster).

Does that strike a chord?

Phil

Absolutely. I had the volume "Carpatnian Disaster" (which was about the 1916 Brusilov Offensive). I did not have the Hitler book, but I had volumes on Student, Guderian, The Blackshirts, The Night of the Long Knives, The Reichstag Fire, and Skorzeny. Alas, in some house cleaning about 1998 I gave the whole set of books to an acquaintance who was into military history, and who had allowed a co-worker of mine and several others (including myself) have periodic use of his home to show an evening of war/history related films (on video back then) on particular themes (Rommel, the '45 Jacobites, etc.).

Jeff