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All worthy points.....I put a lot down to Ewell's "sluggishness" on the first day..Lee shouldn't have to tell him seizing the high ground would be a good thing....Otherwise,I like Pickett's response to questions about the defeat...He said he thought the Yankees had something to do with it...........
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Picking up the Gettysburg theme:
I have just completed a fairly comprehensive review of the First Day and embarked on the Second.
Some observations based on that:
a) ILLNESS - it is amazing how many leaders on the Confederate side seem to have illness claimed or cited as a factor in their performance:
* R E Lee (Army): angina/heart trouble; diahorrea; self-treatment with quinine?
* AP Hill (Corps): delicate on 1 July; suffering from gonhorrea
* Richard Ewell (Corps): knocked off his horse early after arrival on the field - shaken?
*Rodes (Division) - unwell, said to have spent much time in an ambulance; almost invisible on Day 2. All this is contrary to his previous reputation. performance, co-ordinating his brigades on Day 1, initially ineffective -see O'Neal's and Iverson's attacks.
b) Union Field Commanders - on Day 1 the Union forces on the field were command successively by:
Buford; Reynolds (killed); Doubleday; Howard; Scott Hancock; Slocum and finally Meade
SEVEN different men. This surely cannot have been good for effective command and control, overall planning and co-ordination and may have resulted in teh collapse of I and XI Corps in the afternoon. Howard appears to have been the least effective of the seven and disputed Hancock's right to take command, even though the latter had Meade's written authority. Thankfully, Hancock was tactful.
c) RE LEE (Marse Robert as someone referred to him above). I came to my in depth study thinking Lee a military genius. I now wonder about his ability at every level of command in the Gettysburg campaign:
* the very conception of the campaign and its objectives;
* his discretionary orders which backfired on almost every occasion (Ewell several times);
* his handling of Longstreet especially on Day 2 (giving orders direct to McClaws;
* his loss of control of Stuart and his cavalry (partic crucial);
* his lack of initiative in gaining Cemetery and Culp's Hills on evening of Day 1:
* his decision to take the tactical offensive.
I could go on but that will do for now.
Over to others.
Phil
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I think they may have been an offshoot of the partwork: HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (published by Purnell in the UK) which I collected in the mid 60s.
I have put my hand on one of the volumes to which I think you maybe referring "Hitler", published as The Pan/Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II (War Leader Book No 1). It is edited by Barrie Pitt and says it was first published in the USA 1970. I also have volumes on the London Blitz, the Nuremburg Rallies, and one I think on WWI (Carpathian Disaster).
Does that strike a chord?
Phil
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I am willing to go onto other battlefields, but I do have a question.
About forty years back there were a uniform series of books (roughly 130-150 pages each, with good illustrations and bibliographies) put out by Ballentine Press, entitled "The History of a Violent Century", and edited by Barrie Pitt, author of the book "Zeebrugge". I used to have nearly thirty volumes but I gave them away. Each was by a different author, and dealt with military campaigns in the 20th Century, mostly in the two World Wars, military and major political leaders, battles, and even certain social conflicts (including a volume on the Suffragettes, by the way). I am just curious if anyone else here ever heard of or read any of these volumes.
Jeff
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Originally posted by Phil H View PostLee at Gettysburg is a subject for another thread - I'd be happy to participate.
Myself, I've become a bit of an apologist for Ewell and my attitude to Longstreet is hardening to highly critical. To me the failures though, were Powell Hill and Lee himself.
I just skimmed the 100 Years War book by Venning over a curry - excellent (book as well as curry!).
Phil
In particular your views on Ewell, Longstreet, Hill, and "Marsh Robert" would be welcome.
No curry for me tonight (edible or Dr. Frankenfurter). Instead I just ordered broiled filet of sole from a local restaurant.
Jeff
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Lee at Gettysburg is a subject for another thread - I'd be happy to participate.
Myself, I've become a bit of an apologist for Ewell and my attitude to Longstreet is hardening to highly critical. To me the failures though, were Powell Hill and Lee himself.
I just skimmed the 100 Years War book by Venning over a curry - excellent (book as well as curry!).
Phil
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Originally posted by Phil H View PostThere's a book that might interest some of you posting in this thread. I bought a copy today, and in the light of what has been said here, it is fascinating!
The author talks about the impact of Jeanne d'Arc, what differences there might have been had Henry V lived etc etc.
I have some of Tom Venning's other books - particularly the one on the Wars of the Roses. Some of you might know my long-standing interest in Richard III and I find Venning's "speculations" highly stimulating.
I also admire his stimulus for the volume of What might have happened had Rome not fallen - The Trigan Empire series years ago!!
Just thought I'd bring this book and the series to your attention. highly recommended if you enjoy the "What Ifs" of history even if you disagree with what is proposed.
Phil
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Originally posted by Phil H View PostBut was Jeanne any different from a symbol, had one been used well - like the Oriflamme - the sacred war banner.
She does not appear to me to have deen a du Guesclin, for instance - a shrewd and effective commander. Rather, to me at least, Jeanne was a rallying point, a "prophecy" fulfilled maybe even a notable figure in an army that lacked personal "magic" (I don't want to use the term charisma, which I don't think Jeanne possessed in the same way (say) Henry V did). The Dauphin was no military leader. I also think Jeanne had a zeal, a certainty, that might have galvanised others.
I take the point about Crecy etc, but my real point was that Henry possessed the"miracle" weapon of the time and the French had not developed any counter to it since the 1350s.
Rather as Lee at Gettysburg used "Napoleonic" tactics in offense when the "mastery" had switched to the defence and his men paid the price. (Not a huge swing but enough.)
Phil
Unless one can point to someone in the military of France at that time that was better than Jeanne as an inspirational leader or an active strategist/tactician, you are left with Jeanne. The only person I can think of (admitting I am not up on the French military command in 1430) is Gilles de Railes - hardly a figure without his own serious side issues.
You are right - Henry at Agincourt does have the super-weapon of the age at his disposal. Sort of like (not totally) Harry Truman with the A - bomb in 1945.
I have problems with Lee's actions at Gettysburg. I sort of excuse his total performance (still pretty good under the circumstances) because he was recovering from a mild heart attack. Also his work was undermined by at least two subordinates (Ewell and - most badly - J.E.B. Stuart). But he had seen the dangers of frontal assaults when Burnside used them AGAINST Lee at Fredericksburg. The slaughter there was due to several needless charges against Marye Heights. That lesson was not lost on Longstreet, who was opposed to "Pickett's Charge" at Gettysburg. It was (apparently) lost on Lee.
Recently I read an article that suggested Lee had only two options after the second day of Gettysburg - retreat to Virginia with his army bloodied but still intact (a repeat of Antietam the previous year), or a final grasp for victory so that he could threaten Washington or Philadelphia or Harrisburg. It is an interesting point, but still in Lee's situation a renewal at the Round Tops would have made more sense than the frontal assault by Pickett's Division. It might not have worked, but (I suspect) it would have been less costly, and not have looked so foolish.
Jeff
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There's a book that might interest some of you posting in this thread. I bought a copy today, and in the light of what has been said here, it is fascinating!
The author talks about the impact of Jeanne d'Arc, what differences there might have been had Henry V lived etc etc.
I have some of Tom Venning's other books - particularly the one on the Wars of the Roses. Some of you might know my long-standing interest in Richard III and I find Venning's "speculations" highly stimulating.
I also admire his stimulus for the volume of What might have happened had Rome not fallen - The Trigan Empire series years ago!!
Just thought I'd bring this book and the series to your attention. highly recommended if you enjoy the "What Ifs" of history even if you disagree with what is proposed.
Phil
Leave a comment:
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But was Jeanne any different from a symbol, had one been used well - like the Oriflamme - the sacred war banner.
She does not appear to me to have deen a du Guesclin, for instance - a shrewd and effective commander. Rather, to me at least, Jeanne was a rallying point, a "prophecy" fulfilled maybe even a notable figure in an army that lacked personal "magic" (I don't want to use the term charisma, which I don't think Jeanne possessed in the same way (say) Henry V did). The Dauphin was no military leader. I also think Jeanne had a zeal, a certainty, that might have galvanised others.
We do, however, have to ensure with Jeanne that we do not fall for the retrospective attribution of things to her, or for the hagiography. People love to simplify history into nice neat patterns - Jeanne may have been a much more mundane figure in reality only later having military influence attrributed to her.
I take the point about Crecy etc, but my real point was that Henry possessed the"miracle" weapon of the time and the French had not developed any counter to it since the 1350s.
Rather as Lee at Gettysburg used "Napoleonic" tactics in offense when the "mastery" had switched to the defence and his men paid the price. (Not a huge swing but enough.)
Phil
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Originally posted by Phil H View PostThe problem I have always had about Agincourt is whether it was a real demonstration of Henry V's military abilities or a fluke.
Not a fluke, I think. Crecy and Poitiers rather point to that. I think, in his archers, he had the medieval military equivalent of the machine gun. The french came on (as the great Duke said) in the same old way.
I think Henry had charisma (undoubted) courage, led from the front (a crucial quality in a leader then) but lacked strategic skill. His predicament at Agincourt was mainly of his own making.
What would have been interesting would have been Henry living until the 1430s and facing Joan of Arc. That would have tested military leadership against military leadership.
Was Joan (Jeanne?) a military leader or an inspirational force? She came along at a time when English leadership had hit a hollow period, maybe Talbot apart.
The French I think suffered from the fact that so many of their experienced leaders (also the councillors of the king and officers of state) fell at Agincourt. Their successors were weak.
Also, politically, Henry might - as King of France had he lived longer (after the death of Charles VI) - have won over the French. The Dauphin was a weak, unpromising character compared to henry's decisiveness. I think too that Henry would have held on to the Burgundian alliance longer, its failure was a main plank in French retrenchment.
Henry would have had himself crowned at Reims almost certainly, depriving Jeanne and Charles of that "coup". The minority government in England, rivalries and the lack of an adult king just when one could have solifified a joint-monarchy were the key failings that gave Jeanne her window.
There is an excellent book about how the dauphin's mother in law - Yolande of Aragon - manipulated events to bring Jeanne to the fore.
Happy to discuss further,
Phil
Your comment is sound, except that the time difference matters. Poitiers and Crecy had occurred decades before Agincourt (two generations earlier, in fact) so that if they showed a glaring overconfidence of the French in those battles nobody knew in 1415 if it would reappear at Agincourt. They might assume it, but there would be risks in doing so.
I tend to agree that Henry lacked strategic skills. He proved to be what Napoleon called a "lucky general" (the type Napoleon preferred to a "brilliant" or learned general).
I suppose the same could be said of Joan, but she did galvanize the French military at a point where they were on the verge of collapse. In a sense she could do for the French in 1430-31 what Henry did for the English at Agincourt at 1415. So I still say a confrontation of their armies would have been interesting - zealous patriotism v. zealous religious faith. It would have been curious to say the least.
Thanks Scorpio for mentioning the Welsh campaign.
Jeff
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Originally posted by Mayerling View PostHi all,
The problem I have always had about Agincourt is whether it was a real demonstration of Henry V's military abilities or a fluke. The victory led to a break in the fighting, and to Henry's marriage to the daughter of the King of France, and then the birth of their son (who became Henry VI), but Henry won Agincourt in 1415 and was dead by 1422. There was no real military follow up (no "Jena to follow Austerlitz" like Napoleon had), so we have to just accept the result of the campaign Henry V had to the Agincourt victory.
What would have been interesting would have been Henry living until the 1430s and facing Joan of Arc. That would have tested military leadership against military leadership.
Jeff
If it counts for anything,Henry fought a successful campaign in Wales with meagre resources prior to his invasion of France.
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The problem I have always had about Agincourt is whether it was a real demonstration of Henry V's military abilities or a fluke.
Not a fluke, I think. Crecy and Poitiers rather point to that. I think, in his archers, he had the medieval military equivalent of the machine gun. The french came on (as the great Duke said) in the same old way.
I think Henry had charisma (undoubted) courage, led from the front (a crucial quality in a leader then) but lacked strategic skill. His predicament at Agincourt was mainly of his own making.
What would have been interesting would have been Henry living until the 1430s and facing Joan of Arc. That would have tested military leadership against military leadership.
Was Joan (Jeanne?) a military leader or an inspirational force? She came along at a time when English leadership had hit a hollow period, maybe Talbot apart.
The French I think suffered from the fact that so many of their experienced leaders (also the councillors of the king and officers of state) fell at Agincourt. Their successors were weak.
Also, politically, Henry might - as King of France had he lived longer (after the death of Charles VI) - have won over the French. The Dauphin was a weak, unpromising character compared to henry's decisiveness. I think too that Henry would have held on to the Burgundian alliance longer, its failure was a main plank in French retrenchment.
Henry would have had himself crowned at Reims almost certainly, depriving Jeanne and Charles of that "coup". The minority government in England, rivalries and the lack of an adult king just when one could have solifified a joint-monarchy were the key failings that gave Jeanne her window.
There is an excellent book about how the dauphin's mother in law - Yolande of Aragon - manipulated events to bring Jeanne to the fore.
Happy to discuss further,
Phil
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Shakespeare's domestic skills were just sew sew. Burbage.
I don't think the stakes stopped the English running - my point was that the psychological impact of the charge was great - the response would be there (almost) whatever the defences. I think what stopped them running was that they had no where to run to.
In battles through history, most casualties have been inflicted in the rout stage of a battle, especially if the winning side has cavalry.
The stakes may have toppled over because henry had them pilled up and replanted at least once as he sought to entice the french to charge him.
Not saying that stakes were not useful, simply that they were not relevant (in my view) to my point.
Phil
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