The Fog Of War

[Phil H]

But was Jeanne any different from a symbol, had one been used well - like the Oriflamme - the sacred war banner.

She does not appear to me to have deen a du Guesclin, for instance - a shrewd and effective commander. Rather, to me at least, Jeanne was a rallying point, a "prophecy" fulfilled maybe even a notable figure in an army that lacked personal "magic" (I don't want to use the term charisma, which I don't think Jeanne possessed in the same way (say) Henry V did). The Dauphin was no military leader. I also think Jeanne had a zeal, a certainty, that might have galvanised others.

We do, however, have to ensure with Jeanne that we do not fall for the retrospective attribution of things to her, or for the hagiography. People love to simplify history into nice neat patterns - Jeanne may have been a much more mundane figure in reality only later having military influence attrributed to her.

I take the point about Crecy etc, but my real point was that Henry possessed the"miracle" weapon of the time and the French had not developed any counter to it since the 1350s.

Rather as Lee at Gettysburg used "Napoleonic" tactics in offense when the "mastery" had switched to the defence and his men paid the price. (Not a huge swing but enough.)

Phil

[Phil H]

There's a book that might interest some of you posting in this thread. I bought a copy today, and in the light of what has been said here, it is fascinating!

The author talks about the impact of Jeanne d'Arc, what differences there might have been had Henry V lived etc etc.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Alternative-History-Britain-Hundred-Years/dp/1781591261/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1375803095&sr=1-2&keywords=Venning

I have some of Tom Venning's other books - particularly the one on the Wars of the Roses. Some of you might know my long-standing interest in Richard III and I find Venning's "speculations" highly stimulating.

I also admire his stimulus for the volume of What might have happened had Rome not fallen - The Trigan Empire series years ago!!

Just thought I'd bring this book and the series to your attention. highly recommended if you enjoy the "What Ifs" of history even if you disagree with what is proposed.

Phil

[Mayerling]

But was Jeanne any different from a symbol, had one been used well - like the Oriflamme - the sacred war banner.

She does not appear to me to have deen a du Guesclin, for instance - a shrewd and effective commander. Rather, to me at least, Jeanne was a rallying point, a "prophecy" fulfilled maybe even a notable figure in an army that lacked personal "magic" (I don't want to use the term charisma, which I don't think Jeanne possessed in the same way (say) Henry V did). The Dauphin was no military leader. I also think Jeanne had a zeal, a certainty, that might have galvanised others.

I take the point about Crecy etc, but my real point was that Henry possessed the"miracle" weapon of the time and the French had not developed any counter to it since the 1350s.

Rather as Lee at Gettysburg used "Napoleonic" tactics in offense when the "mastery" had switched to the defence and his men paid the price. (Not a huge swing but enough.)

Phil

Hi Phil,

Unless one can point to someone in the military of France at that time that was better than Jeanne as an inspirational leader or an active strategist/tactician, you are left with Jeanne. The only person I can think of (admitting I am not up on the French military command in 1430) is Gilles de Railes - hardly a figure without his own serious side issues.

You are right - Henry at Agincourt does have the super-weapon of the age at his disposal. Sort of like (not totally) Harry Truman with the A - bomb in 1945.

I have problems with Lee's actions at Gettysburg. I sort of excuse his total performance (still pretty good under the circumstances) because he was recovering from a mild heart attack. Also his work was undermined by at least two subordinates (Ewell and - most badly - J.E.B. Stuart). But he had seen the dangers of frontal assaults when Burnside used them AGAINST Lee at Fredericksburg. The slaughter there was due to several needless charges against Marye Heights. That lesson was not lost on Longstreet, who was opposed to "Pickett's Charge" at Gettysburg. It was (apparently) lost on Lee.

Recently I read an article that suggested Lee had only two options after the second day of Gettysburg - retreat to Virginia with his army bloodied but still intact (a repeat of Antietam the previous year), or a final grasp for victory so that he could threaten Washington or Philadelphia or Harrisburg. It is an interesting point, but still in Lee's situation a renewal at the Round Tops would have made more sense than the frontal assault by Pickett's Division. It might not have worked, but (I suspect) it would have been less costly, and not have looked so foolish.

Jeff

[Mayerling]

There's a book that might interest some of you posting in this thread. I bought a copy today, and in the light of what has been said here, it is fascinating!

The author talks about the impact of Jeanne d'Arc, what differences there might have been had Henry V lived etc etc.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Alternative-History-Britain-Hundred-Years/dp/1781591261/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1375803095&sr=1-2&keywords=Venning

I have some of Tom Venning's other books - particularly the one on the Wars of the Roses. Some of you might know my long-standing interest in Richard III and I find Venning's "speculations" highly stimulating.

I also admire his stimulus for the volume of What might have happened had Rome not fallen - The Trigan Empire series years ago!!

Just thought I'd bring this book and the series to your attention. highly recommended if you enjoy the "What Ifs" of history even if you disagree with what is proposed.

Phil

Thanks for suggesting Venning's books - I will try to look into this.

[Phil H]

Lee at Gettysburg is a subject for another thread - I'd be happy to participate.

Myself, I've become a bit of an apologist for Ewell and my attitude to Longstreet is hardening to highly critical. To me the failures though, were Powell Hill and Lee himself.

I just skimmed the 100 Years War book by Venning over a curry - excellent (book as well as curry!).

Phil

[Mayerling]

Lee at Gettysburg is a subject for another thread - I'd be happy to participate.

Myself, I've become a bit of an apologist for Ewell and my attitude to Longstreet is hardening to highly critical. To me the failures though, were Powell Hill and Lee himself.

I just skimmed the 100 Years War book by Venning over a curry - excellent (book as well as curry!).

Phil

I would be game for a seperate thread on Lee at Gettysburg (and related issues). I don't think any other battle of the United States is a controvertial as that three day affair, including Little Big Horn or Pearl Harbor.

In particular your views on Ewell, Longstreet, Hill, and "Marsh Robert" would be welcome.

No curry for me tonight (edible or Dr. Frankenfurter). Instead I just ordered broiled filet of sole from a local restaurant.

Jeff

[Scorpio]

If we are all done with Agincourt, then we can move onto Gettysburg. I would also like to cover the Zulu war,Singapore, and possibly Culloden.

[Mayerling]

I am willing to go onto other battlefields, but I do have a question.

About forty years back there were a uniform series of books (roughly 130-150 pages each, with good illustrations and bibliographies) put out by Ballentine Press, entitled "The History of a Violent Century", and edited by Barrie Pitt, author of the book "Zeebrugge". I used to have nearly thirty volumes but I gave them away. Each was by a different author, and dealt with military campaigns in the 20th Century, mostly in the two World Wars, military and major political leaders, battles, and even certain social conflicts (including a volume on the Suffragettes, by the way). I am just curious if anyone else here ever heard of or read any of these volumes.

Jeff

[Phil H]

I think they may have been an offshoot of the partwork: HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (published by Purnell in the UK) which I collected in the mid 60s.

I have put my hand on one of the volumes to which I think you maybe referring "Hitler", published as The Pan/Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II (War Leader Book No 1). It is edited by Barrie Pitt and says it was first published in the USA 1970. I also have volumes on the London Blitz, the Nuremburg Rallies, and one I think on WWI (Carpathian Disaster).

Does that strike a chord?

Phil

[Phil H]

Picking up the Gettysburg theme:

I have just completed a fairly comprehensive review of the First Day and embarked on the Second.

Some observations based on that:

a) ILLNESS - it is amazing how many leaders on the Confederate side seem to have illness claimed or cited as a factor in their performance:

* R E Lee (Army): angina/heart trouble; diahorrea; self-treatment with quinine?

* AP Hill (Corps): delicate on 1 July; suffering from gonhorrea

* Richard Ewell (Corps): knocked off his horse early after arrival on the field - shaken?

*Rodes (Division) - unwell, said to have spent much time in an ambulance; almost invisible on Day 2. All this is contrary to his previous reputation. performance, co-ordinating his brigades on Day 1, initially ineffective -see O'Neal's and Iverson's attacks.

b) Union Field Commanders - on Day 1 the Union forces on the field were command successively by:

Buford; Reynolds (killed); Doubleday; Howard; Scott Hancock; Slocum and finally Meade

SEVEN different men. This surely cannot have been good for effective command and control, overall planning and co-ordination and may have resulted in teh collapse of I and XI Corps in the afternoon. Howard appears to have been the least effective of the seven and disputed Hancock's right to take command, even though the latter had Meade's written authority. Thankfully, Hancock was tactful.

c) RE LEE (Marse Robert as someone referred to him above). I came to my in depth study thinking Lee a military genius. I now wonder about his ability at every level of command in the Gettysburg campaign:

* the very conception of the campaign and its objectives;

* his discretionary orders which backfired on almost every occasion (Ewell several times);

* his handling of Longstreet especially on Day 2 (giving orders direct to McClaws;

* his loss of control of Stuart and his cavalry (partic crucial);

* his lack of initiative in gaining Cemetery and Culp's Hills on evening of Day 1:

* his decision to take the tactical offensive.

I could go on but that will do for now.

Over to others.

Phil

[Steve S]

All worthy points.....I put a lot down to Ewell's "sluggishness" on the first day..Lee shouldn't have to tell him seizing the high ground would be a good thing. ...Otherwise,I like Pickett's response to questions about the defeat...He said he thought the Yankees had something to do with it...........

[Mayerling]

I think they may have been an offshoot of the partwork: HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR (published by Purnell in the UK) which I collected in the mid 60s.

I have put my hand on one of the volumes to which I think you maybe referring "Hitler", published as The Pan/Ballantine Illustrated History of World War II (War Leader Book No 1). It is edited by Barrie Pitt and says it was first published in the USA 1970. I also have volumes on the London Blitz, the Nuremburg Rallies, and one I think on WWI (Carpathian Disaster).

Does that strike a chord?

Phil

Absolutely. I had the volume "Carpatnian Disaster" (which was about the 1916 Brusilov Offensive). I did not have the Hitler book, but I had volumes on Student, Guderian, The Blackshirts, The Night of the Long Knives, The Reichstag Fire, and Skorzeny. Alas, in some house cleaning about 1998 I gave the whole set of books to an acquaintance who was into military history, and who had allowed a co-worker of mine and several others (including myself) have periodic use of his home to show an evening of war/history related films (on video back then) on particular themes (Rommel, the '45 Jacobites, etc.).

Jeff

[Phil H]

I'd like to have had the Night of the Long Knives one.

They were a good series - sensible, well written, accessible. Nothing much like them now. The Osprey series are different in tone and aim, I think.

Phil

[Mayerling]

I recall once reading a book that suggested looking at Lee's battles up to Gettysburg as equations with himself and the Army of Northern Virginia as a
"7" and a "4" or "11". and the North as fielding the Army of the Potomac (a "6") with the various commanders never rising above a "5" for McClellan before 1862, but that the balance of the equation collapsed at Gettysburg because the Army of the Potomac was now (due to reforms by Hooker) an "8", and Meade was a "5" like Little Mac had been. The author of this book suggested the key to the change was the quality of the Northern generals and officers had vastly improved (as did the cavalry) with few exceptions (i.e., Sickels), and that most knew what to do in emergencies that previously would have flummoxed their reactions. Not a fool proof explanation but an interesting one.

Jeff

[Phil H]

Steve

I put a lot down to Ewell's "sluggishness" on the first day..Lee shouldn't have to tell him seizing the high ground would be a good thing. ...

I agree.

But Ewell was new to Corps command and less accustomed to discrentionary orders. Jackson never let his subordinates have "discretion" for heaven's sake - he TOLD then what to do.

After the war Ewell (like Lee) maintained a dignified silence. Most of what we know of him at Gettysburg comes from Trimble and early (both of whom had post-war axes to grind!).

On the whole I think his decision not to try to take the Hills south of Gettysburg during the evening of 1 July, the right one. I say that, given that Lee provided him no support, no fresh troops - albeit Anderson's untouched division (Hill's Corps) was close by - and Longstreet's utter lack of enthusiasm. Lee failed even to provide artillery support on Seminary Ridge where there were good positions, while there were none on Ewell's front. If the rest of the ANV would not support him, why should Dick Ewell take all the blame?

A topic for discussion might be Ewell's reliance on Jubal Early though.

People say Jackson might have taken the Hills, but by 4.30, when the Union line collapsed, the town was in chaos, the Confederate troops were disorganised and there were prisoners to take care of in large numbers. A hot pursuit might have caused the Union forces a problem, but Hancock and Howard had many guns and a whole unused brigade in position to resist. So I think even Stonewall might have been repulsed.

Lee's man-management also leaves something to be desired, in my view. He changed his plans about three times on the evening of 1 July. He must have noticed that Hill was unwell and not in control, yet he did nothing. If Ewell was not aggressive enough, why not go and stiffen his backbone in person? - yet Lee goes over for a leisurely conference about his intentions for the next day!

Yet all that said, Day 1 had been a huge success for the ANV - two whole AoP Corps mauled and routed. This was what Lee had hoped for and if Meade had fallen back to say the Pipe Creek Line rather than standing at Gettysburg, the 1 July would have been celebrated as a significant Confederate success, I believe.

Then Lee routs two more Union Corps on 2 July!!! The recent book by Guelzo suggests that Meade did come close to pulling out on 2 July - again, if he had, how different history might have been.

Phil