The Sinking of the RMS Titanic and other ships.

[Ben]

My view on that, Ben, is that's a touch unkind

Not really, Fleets.

Many of the Wehrmacht seniority spoke enthusiastically of the "Fuhrer's genius" and other sentimental phrases when the going was ostensibly good, even in private, and only voiced their criticisms once they were in captivity and Hitler was safely dead. While there is no doubting the abilities of someone like Manstein, for example, he didn't simply follow orders that he privately rejected. He voluntarily issued orders that were ideologically pursuant to the Nazi stance on the conduct of troops "in the East". Yes, there were skilled military strategists in the German army, but they weren't especially in the majority, and it certainly wasn't the case that they all followed orders that were against their professional and moral inclinations. Indeed, Hitler would not have come to power without the support of the army, who - again at no insistence from Hitler - swore an oath of allegience to him.

[Phil H]

One only has to name von Rundstedt, Manstein, Guderian, Rommel to indicate the sort of talent present in the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht.

The "political generals" such as Keitel, Brauchitsch maybe Jodl, and Nazi/Luftwaffe grandee, Goering, do not represent the sort of talent in depth that the German Army could deploy in the fieldand whose abilities were demonstrated, sometimes under extreme conditions, in the delays they imposed on the allies.

These were the men who took the small army of the Weimar Republic, expanded it and trained it, and made it capable of delivering a style of attack (nicknamed Blitzkrieg) that took Europe by storm.

In short, I endorse much of what FM says.

Phil

[Fleetwood Mac]

Some of them may have been, Fleets, but there were an awful lot of sycophants amongst the Wehrmacht top brass.

My view on that, Ben, is that's a touch unkind.

Yes, many kept their mouths shut; dissenters were given short shrift etc.

But, they were professional soldiers first and foremost. Their duty was to the nation, whoever was in charge making whatever decisions.

Many of them had grave reservations over the invasion of France etc, and when the invasion of the Soviet Union was in preparation, many realised that it would end in disaster.

You had the likes of von Manstein who was respected and basically took the piss out of Hitler when not in attendance, but didn't disobery his orders. After all, he was a professional soldier.

None of them particularly liked him, and saw him as some crude yokel with no brains.

I don't think obeying orders makes them sychophants: it was their job/s.

[Mayerling]

Mind you, you'd have to be as mad as a March hare to declare war on the United States from that position, but then I suppose he was.



I'd disagree with that, Adam. The Germans had excellent generals; shame Hitler didn't listen to any of 'em.



The Germans were opportunistic in their approach.

They marched into Rhineland and no one stopped them.

So they had a crack at Czechoslovakia and no one stopped them.

And so on.

The one consistent war aim was land in the East but the rest of it was just made up as they went along, lurching from one opportunistic grab to another. I mean, what do you expect from a man who didn't get out of bed til 2 o'clock in the afternoon, spent the afternoon watching British films about the British occupation of India, and every now and again moved imaginary armies around a map while completely ignoring his generals. I can't imagine there has ever been a more stupid man in charge of any country.

Hi Fleetwood,

Right on both counts and a third: He was as mad as a March hare, he was a stupid man, and he was convinced he was brlliant (and had an uncanny ability to convince others who were better educated (i.e. Joseph Goebbels, Albert Speer) that he was brilliant - in Speer's case at least for awhile!

I will grant you that some of the Generals were brilliant and innovative: Rommel, Von Runstedt, Mannstein, Student, Guderian. What though does one do with Halder and Keitel? Jodl apparently had some ability. And what about real vicious garbage types like Sept Diedrich, or the SS General who destoyed the Warsaw Ghetto?

I have always believed that Germany's self-image had a major flaw in it because of the nature of it's lightning victories. In the three wars of the 1860s-70s, it faced a third class power (Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein), and two rotten superpowers (the Austrian Empire and the France of Napoleon III). I find it instructive that little Denmark gave Prussia (with the assistance of Austria) the hardest time in those three wars - it took a year to defeat her. Austria fell in six or seven weeks, and was allied with some southern German Catholic states like Bavaria. But it still was able to defeat Prussia's ally Italy at the naval battle at Lissa (ironically, due to naval reforms put through by Admiral Tegethoff's old chief, the doomed Archduke Maximillian, Emperor of Mexico). France again had a technological advantage - the mitreuse machine gun (I think that is the spelling) but it had not been properly brought to the attention of French troops - most got the guns with instructions! Napoleon was trying to keep ahead of the times by seemingly liberalizing his empire with Emile Olivier, his leading Parliamentary critic. It really was not the time to bring a war. But Napoleon was upset at the way Prussia's Bismarck had humiliated him first on the issue of not giving him Luxembourg as a bribe for not going to war allied to Austria, the on the issue of the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Kingdom of Spain. The Ems telegram was Bismarck's masterpiece at manipulating Napoleon. But the point is none of these foes (except Denmark) really put up a fight. As for generals Moltke the elder and Roon were good ones, as opposed to the like of Bazaine.

Same thing in 1930-1942- Hitler has a field day with most of Europe as he is better armed than countries he "conquers" like Holland, Belgium, Norway. It is instructive though that when Marhall Mannerheim of Finland told the Germans he would make peace with Stalin and fight them if they tried to remove Finnish Jews, they backed down (i.e. Mannerheim was a brilliant commander - it would have been harder). Geographic reasons preserved Switzerland from falling by blitzkrieg (imagine tiger tanks over the alps?).
Turkey was neutral (which surprised and disappointed Hitler) because Kemal Attaturk and his friend and successor Ismet Innanu both despised Hitler and Musollini - and felt Germany used Turkish men as cannon fodder in the Gallipoli Campaign (it did not help the German cause with Turkey that everyone knew that Attaturk was the victor of that campaign, but Liman von Sanders claimed he was responsible).

France's long standing internal contradicions and difficulties (going back to 1789) basically undercut the fighting spirit. There was no Napoleon or even Lazare Carnot to save their command - no Marshal Ney. Just Weygand.* By the way, Maginot line did prove to be affective in German hands in 1944 against advancing Americans. The forts could be useful in either direction.

* There was DeGaulle, but he was in a tiny minority among French officers.

Even Spain proved a little difficult. Probably the slippiest of German allies was Franco. He was aware of the debt he owed Hitler in helping him win, but he was also aware that the Spanish had been decimated in that five year Civil War and deserved a long rest. He was clever enough to allow ultra-right wing Spaniards (many of them his rivals) a chance to form a regiment to assist the Germans in Russia (where it was decimated). In 1943, sensing that he had to call in all debts to strengthen the German position, Hitler met Franco on the French/Spanish border (on the Spanish side). Hitler was known to show his ferocity on one-on-one meetings. When he threatened President Hascha of Czecholovakia in 1938, the elderly Hascha had a heart attack. I am glad to say that for a change Hitler met a man reknowned for being the coolest head in Europe. Apparently for four hours Hitler berated and yelled in every way to convince Franco to send in the Spanish Army to help Hitler out. After four hours, the Fuhrer was exhausted and Franco cool as ever. He thanked Hitler for past assistance, explained he could not spare a single soldier except the volunteers he sent before, and wshed Hitler well.
Hitler never had such an experience again (unfortunately).

I agree that had the 1941 Operaton Barbarossa been sucessfully on time, and took Moscow, it would have been effective - except for one man (not Zhukov, despite my admiration for his abilities). Joseph Stalin was as mad a March Hare as Hitler, and as determined to beat the other. Witness the bloodbath at Stalingrad, basically because the two nuts were concerned about getting that city with THAT NAME! Stalin would have pulled back - beyond the Urals. A temporary victory for the Nazis at best.

Jeff

[Ben]

The Germans had excellent generals; shame Hitler didn't listen to any of 'em.

Some of them may have been, Fleets, but there were an awful lot of sycophants amongst the Wehrmacht top brass.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Fleetwood:

The might of the German military, certainly from a technological and strategic point of view (i.e. Blitzkrieg) was certainly vastly superior to that of the Allies during WWII in my opinion, but the Allies knew how to fight the war better and the Germans repeatedly shot themselves in the foot - starting with the invasion of Russia.

It was certainly superior to the British Army as the British had always had a small standing army and had spent the inter war years demilitarising.

But, French technology was at least a match for the Germans. The problem for the French was one of morale and they were doomed before a shot was fired. As said, loads of 'em surrendered before a shot was even fired, with memories of WW1, particularly Verdun, still fresh in the memory.

The Germans were always going to attack Russia. I mean, there primary war aim was land in the East. It'll always be wondered what would have happened in the event the Germans kept marching towards Moscow rather than turning South. Once you've knocked out the capital with its symbolic meaning and importance to communications, it's very difficult to recover from that.

Mind you, you'd have to be as mad as a March hare to declare war on the United States from that position, but then I suppose he was.

The Allies had far better quality military commanders, and the good quality military commanders Hitler had at his disposal, for some reason or another, usually ended up in worse off position (look at what happened to Erwin Rommel.) Many of them had no understanding of how to fight a war and prefered the glitz and glamour of their position more, and this ended up taking its toll.

I'd disagree with that, Adam. The Germans had excellent generals; shame Hitler didn't listen to any of 'em.

Of course none of this has much to do with propaganda but it might well have been that the Germans tricked themselves into believing in their own superiority a little too much.

Cheers,
Adam.

The Germans were opportunistic in their approach.

They marched into Rhineland and no one stopped them.

So they had a crack at Czechoslovakia and no one stopped them.

And so on.

The one consistent war aim was land in the East but the rest of it was just made up as they went along, lurching from one opportunistic grab to another. I mean, what do you expect from a man who didn't get out of bed til 2 o'clock in the afternoon, spent the afternoon watching British films about the British occupation of India, and every now and again moved imaginary armies around a map while completely ignoring his generals. I can't imagine there has ever been a more stupid man in charge of any country.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Hello again Fleetwood,

I forgot to discuss your comment on the idiotic mountain campaigns (the 12 battles of the Isonzo) between Austria and Italy. Austria's value as a military partner to Germany was really limited to protecting (supposedly) Germany's back from Russia's "Steamroller" (they thought. In fact, Austria had to be bailed out several times in the war by German when Germany desperately could have used the men on the western front. Serbia's General Putnik managed to mangled Austria's army for nearly a year until a German force was sent n 1915 (Bulgaria was of some help to Germany there). The Italian front was a stalemate until the German's won a surprising vctory at Caporetto in 1917. As for the Russians, their own idiotic General staff (ahh, for the great days of Sumkohlnikoff, Sampsonov, and Rennenkampf) did marvels. Still they enabled Germany to create the best military team of the war - Ludendorff and Von Hindenburg - at Tannenburg. But in 1916 Russia finally sent a good commander tothe front -Alexei Brusilov - who almost defeated Austria-Hungary. Roumania's opportunistic declaration of war as a Russian ally wrecked Brusilov's plan (and enabled Erick Von Falkenheim to partly repair his reputation by conquering Roumania).

I suppose that Germany was just stuck with this stupid alliance (although a sacrifice of Austria-Hungary to be shared by Hungary, Russia, and Italy might have worked after 1866). My guess is that Bismarck couldn't do it because of the Catholic German states led by Bavaria (connected to Austria by the Hapsburg - Wittlesbach relationship). It is instructive that in 1900 Austria's military was the leader in only one area -they had the most attractive braided uniforms in Europe (good for Strauss and Lehar operettas I guess).

Horse cavaly still had a powerful role after 1918. The Polish cavalry saved Warsaw in 1921. which was why it still was used in 1939.

Jeff
'

I think you're right, Jeff.

The Germans fancied their chances of beating the French and then turning to beat the Russians with the Austrians playing a supporting role. The Russians sort of put a spanner in the works by marching into Austro-Hungarian territory and pushing back the Austrian Army.

The Germans did have one major advantage on the Western Front. They held French territory so they dug in and pretty much said come and take it back. The British and French could not really dig in and wait as they were supposed to be on the front foot pushing the Germans out of France, which is why French and British trenches were shoddy as they were meant to be temporary, while the Germans dug all sorts of elaborate trenches as they were planning on going nowhere, except for the odd offensive campaign such as Verdun.

Although it was a hairy moment when the Russians surrendered and the Germans moved their Eastern armies to the West.

I think the real value of the British and her associates (Canada, Australia etc) was the ability to learn from her mistakes, and stay the course, so the British Army that bungled at The Somme learned from the mistakes and used advanced tactics further down the line, such as, I suppose, early blitzkrieg methods, that did the trick. Not bad for an army of civilians made up of cooks, shopkeepers, gardeners etc.

The idea that the Germans were 'stabbed in the back' on the home front belies the fact that they were surrendering in droves, particularly to the British (and associates), and deserting too; the German Army was running out of food supplies, munitions and was low on morale.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Hi Fleetwood,

Actually I think the Croats calling the Serbs Fascistic is the pot calling the kettle black. Serbs may not have clean hands in the treatment of their neighbors (they did try under their King Alexander of Yugoslavia to force their view on all the neighbors they had inherited), but the Croats collaborated with Hitler very willingly on the Final Solution. I have had mixed feelings about the re-emergence of Croatia ever since the 1980s.

Hi Jeff,

Believe it or not, according to Croat history the agreement with the Nazis is Serbian propaganda. I was taken aback by it to say the least, and I always feel that there's something dangerous about a person or people who refuse to admit their mistakes along the way.

Having said that, Croatia is a fantastic country and I would recommend it to any American visiting Europe.

What I should have said was that it might have been possible to have put off the 1914-1918 Armaggedon in Europe for at least twenty or thirty years. It had been barely avoided from 1878-1914 on several occasions. Moreover some French politicians (Joseph Caillaux, for example) were beginning to quetion the war of revenge idea. Jules Ferry had done so (with some success) in the 1880s, and Caillaux (who was an expert on the economy) realized that Wilhelmine Germany was the center of the continent's economic strength, and that France could fit in as a slightly junior partner. Unfortunately too many political loudmouths wanted revenge (why? - France grabbed the lost territories under Louis XIV from the Holy Roman Empire) and Caillaux had to leave office in 1914 to help his wife's murder trial (for shooting Caillaux's enemy, Gaston Calmette - editor of Le Figaro - in his office after he published embarrassing private correspondence). But while Prime Minister in 1912 Caillaux demonstrated that one could arrive with some degree of satisfaction with the Germans in the second Moroccan Crisis - he gave into to them on some points. A limited Austrian - Russian war over Serbia might have occurred. But to be fair you needed statesmen of the Disraeli, Bismarck, Salisbury, Joe Chamberlain stamp to do so. Instead you had adequate leaders at best (Asquith, Grey, young Winston Churchill - not yet at his best but learning, Poincare) and idiots in the main spots (Bernstorff, Bethman-Hollveg, whoever was Prime Minister in Russia - Isvolski?).

Jeff

Jeff, you hold knowledge there that I don't, so I couldn't call into question some of that.

I would say, however, that war was not inevitable. The leaders of the countries had genuine options, and the war came as a complete surprise to many. In Britain, it was seen as another one of those small quarrels that sprang up in Europe from time to time, so you have a point there. It was likely, however, once the Austrians attacked Serbia.

Germany was the key to it all. If they had backed away, then the Austrians would not have attacked Serbia; Germany actively encouraged an Austrian attack because they wanted a war with France and Russia and hoped to keep Britain out of it; but if Britain was to enter the war against the Germans then the Germans felt that that was a risk worth taking. You have to remember that the British Army was minute compared with the continental European armies and the notion that the British could make a difference in a land war was treated with scepticism in many quarters, including in Britain herself.

Once the Austrians invaded Serbia it was highly unlikely that it would remain local. The Russians were bound to enter, and that's exactly what Germany wanted, and the French had to enter on the side of the Russians due to their agreement and financial ties. Britain was the unknown quantity and the French spent a lot of time trying to convince the British who at no point said "yes" to the French - right up to the eve of war. Because, really, a war wasn't in British interests: we had what we wanted; we stood to lose most in the event of a protracted war. In the same way the US stands to lose most today. I've heard Americans say they aren't happy with Obama bowing to the Chinese Prime Minister, but when you're at the top it's best to let the others have their small victories while you take from here to the end of the earth, and that was the British policy. People assume appeasement began with Chamberlain; appeasement and diplomacy was a strand running through British foreign policy well before Chamberlain - when you've got more than you could possibly ever need you are in a position to give ground here and there when occasion calls.

The problem for the British was that the foundations of our prosperity depended upon freedom of movement around the Northern French coast, and I think the general feeling was that the Germans were capable of defeating both France and Russia in a matter of months. But, as said, German war aims in 1914, stated/documented German war aims that is, did not threaten the British Empire.

[Fleetwood Mac]

Sure... if it you know... worked. Which it didn't. So instead they deprived the Axis countries of their territories and their income, but left them their guns.

Yes, but it didn't fail because it was a bad idea; it failed because of centuries of disputes that no particular system could put to bed in a matter of 20 years.

In the case of Italy, they had grabbed large swathes of the former Austro/Hungarian empire, some of which are still in Italian hands today, e.g. Trieste. Also, they were granted large parts of what today is Slovenia. So, Italy certainly didn't lose any territory.

In terms of Germany, it's much more complicated than your view as per the above. Yes, they lost territory but there were ethnic Germans all over the place including right up to the River Volga. German war aims didn't simply amount to reclaiming lost land, they wanted land to incorporate ethnic Germans who had been living outside of Germany for centuries. Plus, it was not in British or American interests to have a weakened Germany in the centre of Europe; the British in particular despised and feared Communism and its potential for moving West. So, Germany was given a very, very good deal during the inter war years by the British and Americans who pushed for the Versailles Treaty to be reformulated and turned a blind eye when the Germans weren't paying up and when they flouted the stipulations laid out in the treaty.

The idea that the Versailles Treaty was an important factor in WW2 is a popular misconception. The Germans paid virtually none of their reparations in real terms; the Germans had imposed a far harsher treaty on France in 1870 and Russia in 1917. So, you know, play with fire and all that.

[Errata]

The whole point of the League of Nations, an American idea, was to prevent another WW1. The Americans, the one's who mattered, felt WW1 had been caused by secret and binding pacts; and they concluded that an international body charged with resolving disputes among nations would resolve the issue. Not a bad idea at all.

Sure... if it you know... worked. Which it didn't. So instead they deprived the Axis countries of their territories and their income, but left them their guns.

[Adam Went]

Fleetwood:

The might of the German military, certainly from a technological and strategic point of view (i.e. Blitzkrieg) was certainly vastly superior to that of the Allies during WWII in my opinion, but the Allies knew how to fight the war better and the Germans repeatedly shot themselves in the foot - starting with the invasion of Russia.

The Allies had far better quality military commanders, and the good quality military commanders Hitler had at his disposal, for some reason or another, usually ended up in worse off position (look at what happened to Erwin Rommel.) Many of them had no understanding of how to fight a war and prefered the glitz and glamour of their position more, and this ended up taking its toll.

By the time their new weapons were being constructed and put to use in the latter stages of 1944, such as the V1 and V2 rockets, it was too late to turn the tide of the war.

Of course none of this has much to do with propaganda but it might well have been that the Germans tricked themselves into believing in their own superiority a little too much.

Cheers,
Adam.

[Mayerling]

Hello again Fleetwood,

I forgot to discuss your comment on the idiotic mountain campaigns (the 12 battles of the Isonzo) between Austria and Italy. Austria's value as a military partner to Germany was really limited to protecting (supposedly) Germany's back from Russia's "Steamroller" (they thought. In fact, Austria had to be bailed out several times in the war by German when Germany desperately could have used the men on the western front. Serbia's General Putnik managed to mangled Austria's army for nearly a year until a German force was sent n 1915 (Bulgaria was of some help to Germany there). The Italian front was a stalemate until the German's won a surprising vctory at Caporetto in 1917. As for the Russians, their own idiotic General staff (ahh, for the great days of Sumkohlnikoff, Sampsonov, and Rennenkampf) did marvels. Still they enabled Germany to create the best military team of the war - Ludendorff and Von Hindenburg - at Tannenburg. But in 1916 Russia finally sent a good commander tothe front -Alexei Brusilov - who almost defeated Austria-Hungary. Roumania's opportunistic declaration of war as a Russian ally wrecked Brusilov's plan (and enabled Erick Von Falkenheim to partly repair his reputation by conquering Roumania).

I suppose that Germany was just stuck with this stupid alliance (although a sacrifice of Austria-Hungary to be shared by Hungary, Russia, and Italy might have worked after 1866). My guess is that Bismarck couldn't do it because of the Catholic German states led by Bavaria (connected to Austria by the Hapsburg - Wittlesbach relationship). It is instructive that in 1900 Austria's military was the leader in only one area -they had the most attractive braided uniforms in Europe (good for Strauss and Lehar operettas I guess).

Horse cavaly still had a powerful role after 1918. The Polish cavalry saved Warsaw in 1921. which was why it still was used in 1939.

Jeff
'

[Mayerling]

Hi Jeff,

On the Serbian issue: I've just pent a few weeks in Croatia, Slovenia, Italy and the Croats view of their history was the funniest thing I've read in years. They simply blamed everything on the Serbs and the whole thing is littered with: "the brave, freedom loving Croats" and the "murderous, fascist Serbs". I suppose you have to have a certain sense of humour, but the idea that one people can be so good and the other so bad, and someone in a position of authority is prepared to put that into print, was a comedy gem for me.

The Serbs were good mates with the Russians, which was never going be a point of friendship with the British.

Localised war? the Germans were chomping at the bit as the 'Land in the Middle' and that peculiarly German romanticism drawn from Greek Tragedy and bordering on self-destruction. So, they pressed the Austrians knowing full well the Russians would back the Serbs, and the French would back the Russians (financial ties and a fear of Germany). The only real question was this: would it remain a contintental European war? The British were caught between a rock and a hard place: risk German control of Europe, with the Northern French coast being the key, or gamble with the very foundations of the Empire itself.

The wrong choice was made on our part, particularly as German war aims in 1914 amounted to a continental European customs union ran by the Germans, which is pretty much what they have today. We could have lived with that, and in fact the Germans envisaged a situation where they ran Europe and we ran the seas. Then again, I suppose the Pax Britannica was concerned with maintaining a balance in contintental Europe and it was that which lead to a period of unprecedented period of peace, growth and globalism: it worked in the past but not this time.

Anyway, our time was up regardless. Other countries were coming on the scene matching our Protestant work ethic, our aggression, our system of doing things: only bigger and hungrier. WW1 merely accelerated the fall of the British Empire.

Hi Fleetwood,

Actually I think the Croats calling the Serbs Fascistic is the pot calling the kettle black. Serbs may not have clean hands in the treatment of their neighbors (they did try under their King Alexander of Yugoslavia to force their view on all the neighbors they had inherited), but the Croats collaborated with Hitler very willingly on the Final Solution. I have had mixed feelings about the re-emergence of Croatia ever since the 1980s.


What I should have said was that it might have been possible to have put off the 1914-1918 Armaggedon in Europe for at least twenty or thirty years. It had been barely avoided from 1878-1914 on several occasions. Moreover some French politicians (Joseph Caillaux, for example) were beginning to quetion the war of revenge idea. Jules Ferry had done so (with some success) in the 1880s, and Caillaux (who was an expert on the economy) realized that Wilhelmine Germany was the center of the continent's economic strength, and that France could fit in as a slightly junior partner. Unfortunately too many political loudmouths wanted revenge (why? - France grabbed the lost territories under Louis XIV from the Holy Roman Empire) and Caillaux had to leave office in 1914 to help his wife's murder trial (for shooting Caillaux's enemy, Gaston Calmette - editor of Le Figaro - in his office after he published embarrassing private correspondence). But while Prime Minister in 1912 Caillaux demonstrated that one could arrive with some degree of satisfaction with the Germans in the second Moroccan Crisis - he gave into to them on some points. A limited Austrian - Russian war over Serbia might have occurred. But to be fair you needed statesmen of the Disraeli, Bismarck, Salisbury, Joe Chamberlain stamp to do so. Instead you had adequate leaders at best (Asquith, Grey, young Winston Churchill - not yet at his best but learning, Poincare) and idiots in the main spots (Bernstorff, Bethman-Hollveg, whoever was Prime Minister in Russia - Isvolski?).

Jeff

[Fleetwood Mac]

Hi Fleetwood,

You are absolutely right in saying it was one of the costliest mistakes in English history, but the whole war was a mistake. In 1903 Serbia had a palace coup that was extremely bloody. King Alexander and his wife Queen Draga, and her two brothers, were butchered in the royal palace by a secret group who favored the rival royal house (and replaced Alexander with King Peter - the king in 1914. Alexander, like his father King Milan, cooperated with the Austro-Hungaria Empire, and this was why the military decided to get rid of him. But it was such a bloody business the Serbs were ostracized by most of Europe (including France and England) on the diplomatic front. Had Count Bernstorff, the Austrian foreign minister, published the results of the report on the assassinations of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Countess Sofie Chotek, revealing the connection of Prinzip and his co-assassins with an underground group connected to the same militay people as the ones who killed Alexander and Draga the Serbs would have been isolated again (except for Russia). It is possible a limited war would have resulted.

Jeff

Hi Jeff,

On the Serbian issue: I've just pent a few weeks in Croatia, Slovenia, Italy and the Croats view of their history was the funniest thing I've read in years. They simply blamed everything on the Serbs and the whole thing is littered with: "the brave, freedom loving Croats" and the "murderous, fascist Serbs". I suppose you have to have a certain sense of humour, but the idea that one people can be so good and the other so bad, and someone in a position of authority is prepared to put that into print, was a comedy gem for me.

The Serbs were good mates with the Russians, which was never going be a point of friendship with the British.

Localised war? the Germans were chomping at the bit as the 'Land in the Middle' and that peculiarly German romanticism drawn from Greek Tragedy and bordering on self-destruction. So, they pressed the Austrians knowing full well the Russians would back the Serbs, and the French would back the Russians (financial ties and a fear of Germany). The only real question was this: would it remain a contintental European war? The British were caught between a rock and a hard place: risk German control of Europe, with the Northern French coast being the key, or gamble with the very foundations of the Empire itself.

The wrong choice was made on our part, particularly as German war aims in 1914 amounted to a continental European customs union ran by the Germans, which is pretty much what they have today. We could have lived with that, and in fact the Germans envisaged a situation where they ran Europe and we ran the seas. Then again, I suppose the Pax Britannica was concerned with maintaining a balance in contintental Europe and it was that which lead to a period of unprecedented period of peace, growth and globalism: it worked in the past but not this time.

Anyway, our time was up regardless. Other countries were coming on the scene matching our Protestant work ethic, our aggression, our system of doing things: only bigger and hungrier. WW1 merely accelerated the fall of the British Empire.

[Fleetwood Mac]

You should have said "It makes me wonder about the MALE human mind".

It's men that tend to create wars.

That's an interesting point, and I wonder what de Beauvoir would say on this matter.