Originally posted by curious4
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Not necessarily. Thus, under the McNaughton Rules the accused has to be "labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind [not to be confused with disease of the brain] and not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing , or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
So, an example might be stabbing someone with a bread knife, but thinking it was a banana. Kicking someone whilst having an epileptic fit would also allow for an insanity defence: R v Sullivan (1984). However, in R v Windle (1952), a man killed his suicidal wife. He then said, "I suppose they will hang me for this." That proved that he knew what he was doing was legally wrong, even though he might have believed it to be morally right. Insanity was therefore not available as a defence.
In the case of JtR I would argue that he must have known the "nature and quality of the act he was doing", at least on the basis that he appeared to demonstrate a degree of skill when mutilating his victims; and that his crimes also indicated a basic degree of planning (although if Lynn Cates' argument against Issenschmidt proves to be correct, I think he would probably be legally insane!). The question therefore is whether he realized that murdering and mutilating women was against the law! Well, as he seemed to take basic precautions against getting caught, I would have thought that he must have. Therefore, not legally insane.
Of course, today a defence of diminished responsibility would be available, but not in 1888: together with provocation, this defence, to a charge of murder, was introduced by the Homicide Act, 1957.
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