Hi Steve...all,
Custer was trying what had worked before, with some flying by the seat of the pants adjustments to a rapidly changing situation. He had divided his regiment at the Washita in Nov. '68 in order to hit- what ended up being Black Kettle's camp- from all sides at once. This tactic effectively kept an enemy from developing an organized defense or making an escape. It worked for that reason and because it was winter. The plains Indians were most vulnerable at that time. They would camp along the bluff of a stream for protection from the bitter winds. Their grass fed ponies had lost much weight and could not be ridden very far until spring.
Another critical component was that he moved into position and attacked at dawn. Save for the boys tending the pony herd, everyone was asleep.
Even there, however, 'Custer's luck' came into play. He never bothered to reconnoiter to determine the enemy's exact position and strength. What he didn't know was there were several camps along the Washita. If not for the winter conditions, they could have given the 7th much trouble.
One patrol of 19 men, under Major Joel Elliot found that out when they took off after some of the Cheyennes who had fled in the direction of the other camps. They were surrounded and wiped out. Custer only made a half-hearted attempt at finding Elliot's patrol because warriors from these other camps were gathering in strength to oppose him. This caused a riff in the officer corps of the 7th that existed for the rest of Custer's life and exacerbated an already tenuous situation at the Little Big Horn.
On the dismounting of some of the command...
As Steve alluded to, the 'shock and awe' was the impetus of a mounted cavalry charge; to quickly drive into the enemy and disrupt them before and organized defense could be developed. This is likely what Custer intended to do with his battalion while Reno occupied them at the other end of the camp- even though Reno didn't know that.
The lack of reconnoitering; knowing exactly where the other end of the camp was and (most important) where a ford was to get his command quickly across the river gave the warriors who were not in the Reno engagement time to organize a defense while the warriors from the Reno fight could come for support.
With Reno and Benteen effectively neutralized, all of their combined weight could be concentrated upon Custer's lone battalion. Unlike at the Washita, the separate battalions were no longer acting in unison and the warriors were much better armed, their ponies fat and their moral high after defeating Crook.
At this point, Custer was forced to go on the defensive. The tables had turned and effective action became ineffective reaction. The standard defensive tactic of cavalry was to dismount and form skirmish lines, as outlined in another post. It is highly effective against a European style army; not against a less organized, but unpredictable and highly mobile foe who gave no quarter and had no misgivings about their own mortality. It was to them, 'a good day to die.'
Despite the continual belief that the 7th Cavalry was an elite outfit, the reality is that most of these young men (almost half of them immigrants) had never seen combat and none (not even the veterans of other campaigns) had seen fighting on this scale.
As the skirmish lines began to falter and the fighting became close-quartered, the remaining soldiers would instinctively bunch up into little groups as frightened herded animals would do. Command control would be gone. Shear terror would overcome training and discipline; accentuated by the fact that their constant companions and lifeline - their horses, along with the vital extra ammunition they carried- were either dead or scattered to the wind.
At the last moment, some would shoot themselves; others would just get up and run into the coulées in a vain attempt to reach the trees along the river. For the ecstatic Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, it was now like a buffalo hunt, with the terrified quarry mercilessly cut down at close quarter; the slaughter hidden by the clouds of dust and smoke.
Custer was trying what had worked before, with some flying by the seat of the pants adjustments to a rapidly changing situation. He had divided his regiment at the Washita in Nov. '68 in order to hit- what ended up being Black Kettle's camp- from all sides at once. This tactic effectively kept an enemy from developing an organized defense or making an escape. It worked for that reason and because it was winter. The plains Indians were most vulnerable at that time. They would camp along the bluff of a stream for protection from the bitter winds. Their grass fed ponies had lost much weight and could not be ridden very far until spring.
Another critical component was that he moved into position and attacked at dawn. Save for the boys tending the pony herd, everyone was asleep.
Even there, however, 'Custer's luck' came into play. He never bothered to reconnoiter to determine the enemy's exact position and strength. What he didn't know was there were several camps along the Washita. If not for the winter conditions, they could have given the 7th much trouble.
One patrol of 19 men, under Major Joel Elliot found that out when they took off after some of the Cheyennes who had fled in the direction of the other camps. They were surrounded and wiped out. Custer only made a half-hearted attempt at finding Elliot's patrol because warriors from these other camps were gathering in strength to oppose him. This caused a riff in the officer corps of the 7th that existed for the rest of Custer's life and exacerbated an already tenuous situation at the Little Big Horn.
On the dismounting of some of the command...
As Steve alluded to, the 'shock and awe' was the impetus of a mounted cavalry charge; to quickly drive into the enemy and disrupt them before and organized defense could be developed. This is likely what Custer intended to do with his battalion while Reno occupied them at the other end of the camp- even though Reno didn't know that.
The lack of reconnoitering; knowing exactly where the other end of the camp was and (most important) where a ford was to get his command quickly across the river gave the warriors who were not in the Reno engagement time to organize a defense while the warriors from the Reno fight could come for support.
With Reno and Benteen effectively neutralized, all of their combined weight could be concentrated upon Custer's lone battalion. Unlike at the Washita, the separate battalions were no longer acting in unison and the warriors were much better armed, their ponies fat and their moral high after defeating Crook.
At this point, Custer was forced to go on the defensive. The tables had turned and effective action became ineffective reaction. The standard defensive tactic of cavalry was to dismount and form skirmish lines, as outlined in another post. It is highly effective against a European style army; not against a less organized, but unpredictable and highly mobile foe who gave no quarter and had no misgivings about their own mortality. It was to them, 'a good day to die.'
Despite the continual belief that the 7th Cavalry was an elite outfit, the reality is that most of these young men (almost half of them immigrants) had never seen combat and none (not even the veterans of other campaigns) had seen fighting on this scale.
As the skirmish lines began to falter and the fighting became close-quartered, the remaining soldiers would instinctively bunch up into little groups as frightened herded animals would do. Command control would be gone. Shear terror would overcome training and discipline; accentuated by the fact that their constant companions and lifeline - their horses, along with the vital extra ammunition they carried- were either dead or scattered to the wind.
At the last moment, some would shoot themselves; others would just get up and run into the coulées in a vain attempt to reach the trees along the river. For the ecstatic Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, it was now like a buffalo hunt, with the terrified quarry mercilessly cut down at close quarter; the slaughter hidden by the clouds of dust and smoke.
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