The Battle of the Little Big Horn

[Hunter]

This is a thread for discussion of the most famous battle of the American Indian Wars fought on June 25, 1876 in Montana territory.

Phil H. has asked this question about Captain Frederick William Benteen, who's three company battalion was sent by Lt. Col. George A. Custer to reconnoiter to the south of the massive village seen by scouts earlier in the day:

'Did Benteen deliberately delay - either to rescue a shocked and panicky Reno, or because he recognized GAC's danger?

I find the discrepancy between Benteen's photos (cherubic) and his character (acerbic) very disturbing. I think he was capable of extreme duplicity.'

Hi Phil,
As mentioned in the dispatch carried by trumpeter Martini, Benteen was asked to do two things that were difficult to do; to 'be quick' and to bring the ammunition packs. The mule train, guarded by a company strength detail, was very slow and the horses of Benteen's battalion were exhausted from the excursion. You add to this that Benteen wasn't too happy about his previous orders and despised Custer; he probably wasn't very enthusiastic. He thought he had been sent on a 'fool's errand.'

When he arrived at Reno Hill, Reno's battalion had just been repulsed following their attack in the valley; had suffered tremendous casualties and were severely demoralized. Reno was visibly shaken. When a doctor mentioned to him that the rout had demoralized the men, Reno snapped back, "That was a cavalry charge, Sir!"

Most of the warriors engaged against Reno had moved downstream to fight Custer, who, instead of following Reno, had led his five companies further north, apparently to attack the other end of the village. Neither Reno or Benteen knew this and, although Benteen's orders were clear, he and Reno bogged down into indecision. Reno had many wounded that he couldn't leave and Benteen (no admirer of Custer anyway) was convinced by Reno that he was needed there.

As you probably know. Capt. Thomas Weir (who admired Custer) pressed the issue and when he couldn't persuade his commanders to go to the sound of the firing, took his own company and tried to join Custer. Of course, he didn't get very far because, by that time, the whole valley ahead of him was full of Indians.

Although Benteen was probably not enamored with helping Custer and didn't realize the danger that his commander was in, its doubtful that it would have mattered. The Indians had done something they had never really done before; they stood and fought and there were more than enough of them to deal with a single regiment of cavalry; let alone a command that had been divided.

As far as duplicity in Benteen's personality? I don't think so. He was a capable officer, but didn't have the audacity that most successful cavalry commanders shared. His hatred of 'the Custer clan' ran deep and (as seen on these very boards from time to time) animosity can impair an otherwise intellegent individual's judgement and focus.

[Phil H]

Hunter

Thanks for opening this thread.

I'm coming to the battle and the issues fairly fresh - I read a bit some 20 years ago, but have now dived in again.

I'm inclined - on balance - to agree with your very cogent analysis of Benteen. Without his timely intervention, Reno's men would probably have gone the way of Custer's. Certainly Reno appears to have lost his head (shock?) and Benteen was completely professional.

I just find Benteen so difficult and so contradictory. He was certianly capable - it seems to me - of genuinely perceiving events in a wholly self-justifying way (as at the Washita) or of twisting the truth to his own advantage. But your reading of events is probably right.

On the field itself, a friend who visited the site about 15 years ago said that wahat surprised him was that the coulees were invisible when on the higher ground, and then, when you are in the coulees, you can see nothing of what is going on top-side. That may have prevented Custer manoeuvring as he had intended, I suppose. It would also have slowed down Benteen and the mules which were slow anyway.

Weir Point is someway from Custer Hill/the memorial, but it does seem that Weir saw either the last moments of the general's command, or the immediate aftermath.

What is your take on the Indian testimony?

Phil

[jason_c]

Im trying to remember the name of the dead soldier Reno was searching for after meeting up with Benteen. This 30 minute search does not do Reno's(or Benteen's) reputation any favours.


I tend to side with Custer in all this but I admit its largely a romantic response by me. I may well be wrong.

Heres a link to some videos of the modern battle site.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_nhbm...eature=related

[Phil H]

I tend to side with Custer in all this but I admit its largely a romantic response by me. I may well be wrong.

One of the surprises for me, in coming back to this subject after so long a gap, is the changed perception of Custer.

In the 70s in film and books he was "mad, bad and dangerous to know" (Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee/Little Big Man).

Now I see books seeking to explain his tactics as sensible and his military capacity as not rash and unwise, but as well-thought out. In a way that he had a genious for synthesising large amounts of information quickly and decisively.

I'm still trying to come to terms with that!!

Phil

[Errata]

I tend to side with Custer in all this but I admit its largely a romantic response by me. I may well be wrong.

One of the surprises for me, in coming back to this subject after so long a gap, is the changed perception of Custer.

In the 70s in film and books he was "mad, bad and dangerous to know" (Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee/Little Big Man).

Now I see books seeking to explain his tactics as sensible and his military capacity as not rash and unwise, but as well-thought out. In a way that he had a genious for synthesising large amounts of information quickly and decisively.

I'm still trying to come to terms with that!!

Phil

I have issues with it too, regardless of whether or not he was sabotaged or set up, his battle strategy was insufficient for victory. His plan would have failed even if his estimates for their numbers were correct.

On a side note, my uncle was an officer in the 7th Cav for awhile, And they take a weird ghoulish pride in being part of a company that has been wiped out 7(?) times. I can't even imagine how that happens, but thats what they say. 7 times.

[jason_c]

I tend to side with Custer in all this but I admit its largely a romantic response by me. I may well be wrong.

One of the surprises for me, in coming back to this subject after so long a gap, is the changed perception of Custer.

In the 70s in film and books he was "mad, bad and dangerous to know" (Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee/Little Big Man).

Now I see books seeking to explain his tactics as sensible and his military capacity as not rash and unwise, but as well-thought out. In a way that he had a genious for synthesising large amounts of information quickly and decisively.

I'm still trying to come to terms with that!!

Phil

Custer is one of the most politicized non political figures in history. Conservatives tend to lionize him, the Left tend to despise him. Both sides subsequently give Custer various attributes they want to see in him - courage and genius or cowardice and incompetence.

[Hunter]

Custer certainly was no coward. In fact, he may have been brave to a fault. He seemed to not possess those inner stirrings of mortality that most of us have when there is a sense of danger. He had fought in many engagements during the Civil War without getting even a scratch; while men died all around him. Surviving all of that left him with a false sense of invulnerability. The years on the plains didn't change that perception because his foe almost never stood and fought. Of course, this time they did.

What is your take on the Indian testimony?

For many years their accounts weren't given much credibility for a variety of reasons. That has now changed to some degree. It is still hard to develop a lot from what they said because their perception of events was on an individual level instead of a broader scope that whites were accustom to.

They all agreed that the fight didn't last long; about the time it took to eat a meal, I recall one of them remembering. In a military engagement, unit cohesion is paramount for effectiveness and certainly survival. If that is breached, it all becomes chaos very quickly - even with well trained troops- and with the overwhelming force that was arrayed against these 215 some odd men, with no defensive cover, it would be over fairly quickly.

The maxim back then was to save the last bullet for yourself, because they believed the Indians tortured captives. They had all seen or heard stories about the mutilated bodies of white settlers and soldiers- even though this was done after death.

What would be on your mind if you were a young soldier, hundreds of miles from home, with your horse stampeded away; your Springfield carbine jamming on you as you desperately try to pry the cartridge out with a penknife; hundreds of yelping voices all around you that you couldn't even see most of the time.. and arrows arching in from hidden places... and there's nowhere to go?

[Mayerling]

Hello all,

My guess is that at a moment like you'd describe you would feel pretty helpless and hopeless.

I have been aware of the Custer image (I won't say myth) since I read Evan Hunter's book SON OF THE MORNING STAR back in the 1980s. He was a remarkable figure in his day, and like most of us quite complex. He was capable of killing Indian squaws and children in a stupid action in the 1860s, but equally willing to put his reputation on the line for the Indians against Belknap and the Indian Trader Ring in 1876. Maybe he wanted the Presidential nomination in 1876 or not, but in the post-Civil War period Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Harrison all were Generals who became President, William Sherman had to fight to prevent his nomination, and the Democrats did nominate McClellan and "the Superb" Hancock. Some thid party's nominated other Generals too (Greenbacks nominated Butler, for example). So why should Custer have not even thought about it?

I don't know for certain what happened on that June day in 1876. Nobody is ever going to know for certain. Just one thing can be said: Crazy Horse and Gaul out generalled Custer, Reno, and Benteen. And, in the long run, a lot of good it did them for that one day of victory.

Jeff

[Ally]

Oh man, what a topic to get started just when I am going to be AFK for two weeks. I visited the battlefield just this past May and have been actively reading various accounts. The Philbrick book is really interesting for anyone wishing to read some more about it.

I think generally it is conclusive that Reno's decision making and cowardly retreat was the result of significant intoxication, which completely impaired his judgment and also that Custer's defeat was due largely to his own aggrandized ego and desire for glory. He didn't want to share the glory and figured to make a decisive victory, when, if he had only waited for the Terry/Gibbons battalions, they would have won the day ( of course, I'd be sorely disappointed if they had...but I digress). He didn't wait to confirm anything but acted based on sketchy ( and inaccurate) information that confirmed his own "worst fears" and motivated him to act rashly.

The battlefield itself is interesting. They have white marble "tombstones" scattered around the open plains that indicate approximately where soldiers bodies were found, and there are red marble markers to indicate where natives were found..in a sea of white, the red markers are few and far between.

[Phil H]

Fascinating discussion, I was unaware of the "red marble" markers.

On those of 7th Cavalry members, it appears that some of these may not be in the correct places and some might be duplicates. (That is, where a body had initially just had earth scraped over it from two sides, both the resulting "depressions" were later marked as graves!)

For Custer's rationality, the argument seems to be that he realised that the indians were aware of his approach (from scouts and sight of his campfires the previous night) and thus - on the then normal assumption - would be likely to remove to a new encampment. This would frustrate the wider strategy of the campaign - he thus determined to attack at once to forestall the enemy dispersing or denying battle.

Dividing forces is always a risk (perhaps a no-no) in warfare, but Custer appears to have done so in order to create a diversion, allowing him time for a frontal attack on the indian encampment. Reno was strongly resisted, may not have been as determined as Custer wished and was driven off. This allowed the Sioux and Cheyenne to mass their forces against Custer's "half" of the regiment.

Nevertheless, it could be argued - at least from some prospective plans I have seen - that Custer's tactics were not foolish, with a possible approach down medicine tail coulee and a possible wider encircling move to the north.

On disintegration of the 7th, my reading of the archaeolgical conclusions from the mid-80s, is that firing lines appear to have been established at least in some areas.

But somehow or another, of course, the whole of Custer's "battalion" was undeniably overwhelmed.

Could he and a portion of his force, do you think, have escaped north to join Terry, had Custer wished?

My reading on all this is at a very early stage, so I am grateful for what I am learning here and very aware of my comparative ignorance.

Phil

[jason_c]

Fascinating discussion, I was unaware of the "red marble" markers.

On those of 7th Cavalry members, it appears that some of these may not be in the correct places and some might be duplicates. (That is, where a body had initially just had earth scraped over it from two sides, both the resulting "depressions" were later marked as graves!)

For Custer's rationality, the argument seems to be that he realised that the indians were aware of his approach (from scouts and sight of his campfires the previous night) and thus - on the then normal assumption - would be likely to remove to a new encampment. This would frustrate the wider strategy of the campaign - he thus determined to attack at once to forestall the enemy dispersing or denying battle.

Dividing forces is always a risk (perhaps a no-no) in warfare, but Custer appears to have done so in order to create a diversion, allowing him time for a frontal attack on the indian encampment. Reno was strongly resisted, may not have been as determined as Custer wished and was driven off. This allowed the Sioux and Cheyenne to mass their forces against Custer's "half" of the regiment.

Nevertheless, it could be argued - at least from some prospective plans I have seen - that Custer's tactics were not foolish, with a possible approach down medicine tail coulee and a possible wider encircling move to the north.

On disintegration of the 7th, my reading of the archaeolgical conclusions from the mid-80s, is that firing lines appear to have been established at least in some areas.

But somehow or another, of course, the whole of Custer's "battalion" was undeniably overwhelmed.

Could he and a portion of his force, do you think, have escaped north to join Terry, had Custer wished?

My reading on all this is at a very early stage, so I am grateful for what I am learning here and very aware of my comparative ignorance.

Phil

According to some accounts the main turning point of the battle was a suicide charge by a number of native Americans on one of these firing lines.


As far as escape is concerned i think it depends on wether Custer and his men still had their horses. Many of the horses had been scared off by the enemy. There is one interesting story of a near escape by an officer who then committed suicide. This is believed to be Lt Harrington or Jack Sturgis.

[Phil H]

On the suicide charge, I recall reading that indian boys volunteered to carry out such missions and were sort of "blessed" the night before. It reminded me of the later Japanese kamikaze pilots.

Maybe they had a hand in breaching the firing lines?

I wonder what happened if you were such a volunteer suicide and survived?
Were you honoured? Or was it a "curse" or a demerit to be still alive?

On a separate point - do any of you think Custer would have acted differently if he had heard about Crook's experience (and effective repulse) at the Rosebud days earlier.

Might it have made Custer more cautious? Alerted him to the indian's new boldness and initiative?

Phil

[Hunter]

I doubt there was a chance for escape. As soon as the battle developed, Crazy Horse took a large contingent of warriors down the river to the north, swung around and intercepted Custer at the top of what is now called Custer Hill. This move pretty much sealed their fate.

The skirmish lines mentioned in previous posts were L company, commanded by Custer's brother-in-law, Lt. Calhoun and I company, commanded by Capt. Miles Keogh. This was probably done as a rear guard action against the warriors that were driving them away from the center of the village.

The troopers would be ordered to dismount and fight on foot. This would enable them to fire more effectively from the ground with the more accurate carbines (as opposed to the Colt revolvers). One out of every four men would hold the other three's horses; all linked together with a clip that was attached to the halter. There was a lead strap on the halter that the horse holder would use on the end horse to control them and take them to the rear. Of course, this took every fourth man out of combat and as the warriors moved in, there was no rear safety for the horses.

From the archaeological finds, it is apparent that both companies put up a stiff resistance for a while until overwhelming numbers could be massed against them. Calhoun and Keogh were very good officers and they seem to have managed fire control quite well, under the circumstances. The way the bodies were found, most of these men appear to have died at their posts.

This was probably the only real organized resistance during the fight and once they were overrun, the rest of Custer's battalion disintegrated fairly quickly, save a small group of more seasoned veterans that managed to make it to Custer's position for a final stand.

I was not aware of the red markers either. This must be something recently placed. The plains Indians would have taken their dead from the battlefield if given a chance as this was their custom. This is probably some attempt to honor the Sioux and Cheyenne dead in some way. Some of the Indians claimed that their dead were around forty, but it is not known how many warriors died in this fight or how many died of wounds in the coming days; probably far less than Hollywood has depicted given the circumstances.

[Hunter]

I should mention that the story about Crazy Horse and his ride to cut the soldiers off is disputed. Some of the Indian testimony places Crazy Horse at Calhoun Hill. Either way, Custer had become engaged in combat and he had to realize that there was no chance in breaking off an engagement where his opponent was as mobile and well mounted as he was. Going back in the direction he came from was not an option because that route was blocked by the warriors coming from Reno's position.

A dispute over historical interpretation?
Ripperologists can't imagine that now, can they?

There are plenty of myths and perceived myths about this battle.

Did the Indians know that the soldiers were coming or were they surprised?

Did Custer decide to attack that afternoon to gain glory or was it because he thought his command had been spotted and the camp would disperse?

Did Custer disobey Terry's orders?

Did the repeating rifles issued to some of the Indians(for hunting) by U.S. agency agents add to a tactical advantage against soldiers armed with single shot breech loading carbines?

And, of course, the two most enduring questions: Was Custer a fool and who was to blame for the disaster?

[Steve S]

I think....Custer tried what had worked for him before.."Shock and Awe" in recent terms. But this time, there were just too many natives,too well-armed. To me,it's the dismounting of Custer's batallion that shows he had no real idea how badly he was outnumbered...........If, (Big if) he'd thrown his whole command on the line of Reno's attack, it may have had enough impetus to break up the natives before they realised how few soldiers there were......
Steve