Lawende was silenced

[Mr Lucky]

No it isn't a 'legal argument', it's short 5 point verbal chain of reasoning for you to follow, which you have not been able to. To be frank, after you produced that hilarious 'legal argument' that a writ of habeas corpus was required to free someone on bail who had been charged with a misdemeanour I wouldn't bother creating a 'legal argument' about anything for you, it would be a waste of time.

Re your new Counterargument: Creating a series of irrelevant hypothetical situations to justify not understanding the point isn't a valid argument, as you can create an infinite number of the them.

However just briefly skimming over your hypotheticals two things immediately become apparent, firstly you are clearly blissfully unaware of the difference between what’s said under oath and what’s not at the time, and the weight that carried in the context of the times, with a deeply religious culture and an almost total reliance on verbal evidence to convict. Secondly, the events surrounding this murder are unique in themselves, the fact the city solicitor is at an inquest is itself an exceptional event , and on top of that my argument is a precautionary one. With that in mind its clear to me that your endless demands for me to produce similar examples, like your demands for 'legal arguments' when you don't know the basics, is a further demonstration of someone playing to the crowd and who has no genuine or honest interest in the matter.

No more legal gibberish please Mr Lucky.

Taking your compulsive and involuntary reliance on the word “gibberish” into account I'll accept that as a public accusation that I’m lying and I think we can leave it there

[David Orsam]

Once again to clarify;
1)I have not claimed that the rule prohibits the description being used at the inquest, but that it would be the reason used at trial to justify the description not being given at inquest.
2)The rule would apply if/when the description was used at trial, if and only if, the description had previously been given under oath at the inquest.
3)If the description was withheld at the inquest, then the rule could not be applied if/when the description was used at trial, which is the reason why (after consulting the jury) the description was withheld.
4)The description of the man may well become key evidence at any future trial or it may end up being largely valueless, they don't know and just err on the side of caution, but they are trying to prevent the defence from being able to object to the description being given under oath at the public inquest, which they may claim has influenced/prejudiced the trial jury.
5)Paradoxically the solicitor is trying to bias the evidence in favour of the prosecution, but he must be able to substansiate doing so for the defendents benefit. - the defendent must hear the evidence against him
Nothing you have misquoted from Jervis counters anything I’ve said.

This is all more legal gibberish Mr Lucky.

You may not be interested in discussing this further (no surprise there) but let me explain to you, primarily for the benefit of the other members of this forum who may be interested in the subject, where you have gone wrong.

You are still relying on the "general rule" I referred to earlier (and which you call "the rule") which says that evidence cannot be relied on where an accused person has not been able to challenge it. You try to sweep aside my objection that the "general rule" does not apply in respect of inquests by stressing you are referring only to the position at trial. But you still come up with pure legal gibberish I'm afraid.

Let's first say that the "general rule" DID apply at inquests. What would that mean? It would mean that evidence pointing to the guilt of an individual could not be taken into account at that inquest unless that individual had a chance to challenge it by way of cross-examination.

Would the giving of such evidence at an inquest, in the absence of an accused person, have any consequences for a future trial?

Only this. If the witness died or was otherwise absent from the trial, his deposition could not stand as evidence in the trial.

But the city solicitor, in cutting short Lawende's evidence, could not possibly have been worried about Lawende not appearing at the trial. This is because cutting short his evidence would not assist him at trial, bearing in mind that there would then be no evidence on record whatsoever from Lawende about the man's description.

However, as the "general rule" did not apply to inquests, if Lawende had given his evidence in full but then died before the trial, that evidence, in his sworn deposition, COULD potentially have been admissible at the trial, although that might well have been subject to legal argument.

Your renewed insistence that, had Lawende given evidence on oath at the inquest (in the absence of the person later accused of the murder), he could not have given that same evidence on oath at a future trial is where the gibberish lies. It simply isn't true and you have provided no authority in support. To the extent that the "general rule" applies at the trial, this would only ever be where the accused was not present to hear the evidence presented against him during the trial, thus rendering any guilty verdict unsafe.

As I made clear in the imagined exchange between defence counsel and the trial judge in my earlier post, any evidence previously given at the inquest would be utterly irrelevant in circumstances where the defendant WOULD hear the evidence against him at the trial and any such evidence could then be challenged by the defence counsel.

So your argument makes no sense in either law or logic.

I might add that your new theory, which you have mentioned for the very first time since you raised this point in July, namely that the defence at the trial could claim that evidence given on oath at an inquest might influence or prejudice the trial jury (even though that trial jury would not have been present at the inquest), and raise some kind of challenge as a result, is one you make without any legal authority whatsoever and has clearly come off the top of your head. Show me some precedent for this.

And what would the consequence of it be on your new theory if Lawende had given his evidence in full at the inquest? Until now you have been saying no more than that it would mean that Lawende could not have given the same evidence at the trial. But that would not rectify the issue of prejudice of the trial jury arising from the reporting of the inquest evidence would it? If the jury had been aware of Lawende's inquest evidence, so that for some unexplained reason a fair trial was not possible, it would have to lead to the abandonment of the entire trial would it not, because the damage was already done and, in your view, could not be undone?

Was any criminal trial ever abandoned on this basis prior to 1888? Has it been since? How is it even possible that a general description of someone who is not named but said to look like a sailor could possibly have prejudiced the trial of any individual, even if that person was a sailor?

As the jury at trial could only have learnt of Lawende's description from the newspapers, if your argument is correct it would mean that the police could never have released a description of someone wanted for a crime, whether given at an inquest or not, because it might prejudice the jury at a future trial. It's just nonsense isn't it?

To the extent that you are relying on the "general rule" for your proposition about jury prejudice, because evidence was given at the inquest in the absence of the accused, then we simply go back to the quotes I provided from Jervis which shows that any such evidence WAS legally admissible evidence.

We also go back to my point that the jury were given the option of hearing the evidence if they wanted by the city solicitor so that also makes a nonsense of your claim that there was a fear that such evidence could prejudice a prosecution. Had there been such fear the city solicitor would simply have asked for a ruling from the coroner that no such evidence should be adduced.

No more legal gibberish please Mr Lucky.

[Mr Lucky]

Your claim was indeed legal gibberish, Mr Lucky. You seem to have failed to understand that the general rule that I cited expressly does not apply to inquests. So trying to apply that general rule to an inquest, which is exactly what you tried to do earlier in this thread, results in legal gibberish.

Earlier in this thread (#459) I made the point to you that there could not have been any legal reason for Lawende's evidence to be withheld for the very reason that the city solicitor gave the jury the option of hearing it. So you are not countering anything I've claimed at all.

Except that the quotes from Jervis make clear that the general rule that an accused person must have an opportunity of answering a statement to make that statement admissible in evidence does not apply to inquests. Which is the direct opposite of what you have been trying to persuade this forum to believe.

Once again to clarify;
1)I have not claimed that the rule prohibits the description being used at the inquest, but that it would be the reason used at trial to justify the description not being given at inquest.
2)The rule would apply if/when the description was used at trial, if and only if, the description had previously been given under oath at the inquest.
3)If the description was withheld at the inquest, then the rule could not be applied if/when the description was used at trial, which is the reason why (after consulting the jury) the description was withheld.
4)The description of the man may well become key evidence at any future trial or it may end up being largely valueless, they don't know and just err on the side of caution, but they are trying to prevent the defence from being able to object to the description being given under oath at the public inquest, which they may claim has influenced/prejudiced the trial jury.
5)Paradoxically the solicitor is trying to bias the evidence in favour of the prosecution, but he must be able to substansiate doing so for the defendents benefit. - the defendent must hear the evidence against him
Nothing you have misquoted from Jervis counters anything I’ve said.

And your repeated references to "defence council" when it is counsel only shows that you are bluffing when it comes to legal matters.
You don't know how to spell jurisdiction either it seems.

No, I'm bluffing when it comes to spelling matters. As well as dyslexia I’m also a dreadful speller, I do hope this provides some amusement and provides some minor compensation for your total inability to ever challenge anything I say with any sort of intelligent counter argument.

Those statements are not incompatible at all let alone "grossly incompatible".

Contradiction is not a counter argument and people can make their own judgement on the matter.

I provided legal authority for my argument from Jervis on the Coroners Act of 1887. You have provided no legal authority whatsoever to back up a single word of your gibberish. This is despite me asking you to do so as far back as 6 August (see #494). So you've had literally months to come up with something and failed totally.

Randomly quoting from Jervis isn't countering anything I’ve said. Nor is repeatedly using the word “gibberish”. Also as I have pointed out previously when you have asked me for a citation, that I have in the past spent considerable time genuinely trying to help you, only for you to treat it as an open invitation to demonstrate your ignorance and unpleasantness. I'm not wasting my time doing so again.

I have no doubt that city solicitor's reason could in theory have been tactical. But it is highly unlikely to have been because he thought Lawende was going to change his evidence between the inquest and the trial. The most likely reason is that it was, in fact, an operational issue on behalf of the city police whereby the police, for operational reasons, did not want the description of the suspect published.

This is perhaps the most impressive contribution you've made to the thread, and is by far away the strongest argument you have ever come up with. Now, here's the bit you're going to have start intentionally misunderstanding;- the description of the suspect had already appeared in the press on the 2nd.

More strawmen!

Until now, you have been claiming vigorously that the city solicitor had a legal reason for not adducing the evidence of Lawende. That reason being that the defence counsel at trial might argue that the defendant was not receiving fair trial. Now it seems you are saying his reason was tactical, i.e. it might not suit the prosecution for his evidence to be given.

I have not changed my position on anything.

Again, you clearly do now seem to saying it was a tactical decision on behalf of the city solicitor to withhold the evidence. That is not what you have previously stated.

I have not changed my position on anything.

Where in that explanation, full of legal gibberish about a fair trial being the reason for withholding the evidence, did you refer to the city solicitor being worried that the witness might change his evidence between inquest and trial?

I have not referred to “the city solicitor being worried that the witness might change his evidence between inquest and trial?”

If you have abandoned your argument from #457 and #760 then fine – it means there is no significant disagreement between us - but perhaps you can be brave enough admit to what you have done.

I have not changed my position on anything.

The best way to draw a line under this now is for you to simply accuse me of lying and we can leave it at that, I don't want my porridge curdled every morning dealing with your vitriol.

[Pierre]

Mr. Crawford: "Unless the jury wish it, I do not think further particulars should be given as to the appearance of this man."

The Foreman: "The jury do not desire it."

That would indicate that there was willingness to share the full account with the jury, but for the purposes of the Inquest at hand the jury decided Mr Crawford's recommendation was sufficient. So the description and details were available to the jury.

It indicates that the source gives the impression that there was a willingness to share the testimony with the jury.

Pierre

[David Orsam]

So within the space of 3 lines, you've gone from stating my claims are “nothing more than legal gibberish” to acknowledging that it's a general rule.

Your claim was indeed legal gibberish, Mr Lucky. You seem to have failed to understand that the general rule that I cited expressly does not apply to inquests. So trying to apply that general rule to an inquest, which is exactly what you tried to do earlier in this thread, results in legal gibberish.

The reference to the accused, or as I put it “the defence council objecting” refers to the accused at trial not at the inquest.

I know, but there was no possible objection that any defence counsel at the trial could have made on legal grounds had Lawende fully described the man he saw at the inquest.

And your repeated references to "defence council" when it is counsel only shows that you are bluffing when it comes to legal matters.

The above is the reason why the coroners jury could have insisted on hearing the evidence about the clothes if they wanted to, but they choose not to (for some reason). You're not countering anything I've claimed at all.

Earlier in this thread (#459) I made the point to you that there could not have been any legal reason for Lawende's evidence to be withheld for the very reason that the city solicitor gave the jury the option of hearing it. So you are not countering anything I've claimed at all.

There is no correlation between your quotes from Jervis and your conclusion.

Except that the quotes from Jervis make clear that the general rule that an accused person must have an opportunity of answering a statement to make that statement admissible in evidence does not apply to inquests. Which is the direct opposite of what you have been trying to persuade this forum to believe.

The “matter within his juristiction” is the death of the woman, not the appearence of a man seen with her before her death. The coroner/jury can inquire into this matter if they want to, but they don't have to.

If the coroner/jury can, if they please, legally inquire into the appearance of a suspect, such inquiry cannot possibly render that evidence inadmissible at trial. So the city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that this would be the outcome, which is what you have been saying.

You don't know how to spell jurisdiction either it seems.

Additionally; these two statements of yours are grossly incompatable;-

“The city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that Lawende’s description of the man he saw at the scene of the crime could have had any effect on any prosecution of a person later arrested of the crime.”
And
“I might just add that evidence being given at an inquest (and committal proceedings) prior to a trial was a defence lawyer’s delight because he could pick out inconsistencies between the unfailingly different accounts each time to make out that a prosecution witness was unreliable and/or lying.”

Those statements are not incompatible at all let alone "grossly incompatible". All that's happened is that you have not understood them. Defence lawyers always try to pick out inconsistencies in the evidence of prosecution witnesses. The prosecution still goes ahead. So Lawende giving evidence of a man he saw near the crime scene at the inquest would never, and could never, have legally prevented or hindered the prosecution of anyone subsequently arrested for that crime (on the basis there would be not be a fair trial), even if the man arrested was nothing like Lawende's description.

You've had weeks and have clearly spend some time over this and you are unable to source an actual legal argument to counter what I've said and can only resort to childish mockery.

I provided legal authority for my argument from Jervis on the Coroners Act of 1887. You have provided no legal authority whatsoever to back up a single word of your gibberish. This is despite me asking you to do so as far back as 6 August (see #494). So you've had literally months to come up with something and failed totally.

That's the problem that's exactly what they're trying to prevent, but that cannot be given as the reason at trial ! If the judge said to the prosecution “why was this witnesses description of the clothes not given at the inquest?” they have to give a legal argument – they can't say the witnesses memory's on the blink and you get a different answer every time you ask. They have to say something like “ As nothing at the inquest depended on it, with the coroner' s jurys permission it was deemed safer to withold the witnesses description, in case it needed to be examined under oath at trial, m'lud”

Until now, you have been claiming vigorously that the city solicitor had a legal reason for not adducing the evidence of Lawende. That reason being that the defence counsel at trial might argue that the defendant was not receiving fair trial. Now it seems you are saying his reason was tactical, i.e. it might not suit the prosecution for his evidence to be given.

I have no doubt that city solicitor's reason could in theory have been tactical. But it is highly unlikely to have been because he thought Lawende was going to change his evidence between the inquest and the trial. The most likely reason is that it was, in fact, an operational issue on behalf of the city police whereby the police, for operational reasons, did not want the description of the suspect published.

The fact remains they want to give the prosecution the best chance to succeed, that's why the description has not gone down in evidence

Again, you clearly do now seem to saying it was a tactical decision on behalf of the city solicitor to withhold the evidence. That is not what you have previously stated.

Here is what you said earlier in this thread in #457:

"This was caused by a growing schism between the giving of evidence at inquest and at trial which had actually existed in the legal system for centuries but had grown in importance during the development of the adversarial criminal trial process during the 18th and 19th centuries, - effectively for the defendant to have a fair trial he must be able to hear and object to evidence going down on record. If evidence goes down on record at the public inquest it may influence the jury at trial without the defendant being able to do this. If the inquest was likely to end in a named verdict (murder by X instead of person or persons unknown), then evidence could be given “in camara” effectively in secret, not an option with the Eddowes murder. However even in these circumstances the inquest was still technically public, the Coroner could not exclude “the people of the vill” - inhabitants of the area where the body was found - from hearing anything, and the Coroner's jury could not be bound to secrecy.

So that the evidence could still be used at criminal trial."

Where in that explanation, full of legal gibberish about a fair trial being the reason for withholding the evidence, did you refer to the city solicitor being worried that the witness might change his evidence between inquest and trial?

And here is what you said in #760 at the start of this month:

"Actually, I do “honestly” know as I have repeatedly explained; the description has not been used whilst the witness was under oath so that it can, if necessary, still be used at trial as prosecution evidence. Otherwise the defence council would be able to object that the description had gone down on record without the defendant being able to hear it and thereby challenge it, which is his right. The defendant must have a fair trial, he must hear all the evidence against him."

Where in that explanation, full of legal gibberish about defence counsel at trial being able, on the basis of the defendant not receiving a fair trial, to object to witness evidence because such evidence had been given on oath by the witness at an inquest, did you refer to the city solicitor being worried that the witness might change his evidence between inquest and trial?

If you have abandoned your argument from #457 and #760 then fine – it means there is no significant disagreement between us - but perhaps you can be brave enough admit to what you have done.

[Michael W Richards]

Mr. Crawford: "Unless the jury wish it, I do not think further particulars should be given as to the appearance of this man."

The Foreman: "The jury do not desire it."

That would indicate that there was willingness to share the full account with the jury, but for the purposes of the Inquest at hand the jury decided Mr Crawford's recommendation was sufficient. So the description and details were available to the jury.

[Mr Lucky]

This is nothing more than legal gibberish.

Mr Lucky has never provided any authority for his claim and it has no meaning.

I think he has in mind a general legal rule that a person accused must have an opportunity of answering a statement against him in order to render it admissible in evidence.

So within the space of 3 lines, you've gone from stating my claims are “nothing more than legal gibberish” to acknowledging that it's a general rule.

Jervis on the Coroners Act of 1887, however, clearly states that the very opposite of what Mr Lucky is trying to say is the case at an inquest:

"The general rule that the party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence, is clearly inapplicable to coroners inquests, at which there is no accused party."

The reference to the accused, or as I put it “the defence council objecting” refers to the accused at trial not at the inquest. The above is the reason why the coroners jury could have insisted on hearing the evidence about the clothes if they wanted to, but they choose not to (for some reason). You're not countering anything I've claimed at all.

Jervis also states:

"…ordinarily, where there can be no cross-examination, depositions are not admissible; but those taken before the coroner have been said to be an exception to this general rule. The coroner is an elective officer, appointed on behalf of the public, to make inquiry about the matter within his jurisdiction, and therefore the law presumes that the depositions made before him will be fairly and impartially taken."

It really is very clear. The city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that Lawende’s description of the man he saw at the scene of the crime could have had any effect on any prosecution of a person later arrested of the crime.

There is no correlation between your quotes from Jervis and your conclusion. The “matter within his juristiction” is the death of the woman, not the appearence of a man seen with her before her death. The coroner/jury can inquire into this matter if they want to, but they don't have to.

Additionally; these two statements of yours are grossly incompatable;-

“The city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that Lawende’s description of the man he saw at the scene of the crime could have had any effect on any prosecution of a person later arrested of the crime.”
And
“I might just add that evidence being given at an inquest (and committal proceedings) prior to a trial was a defence lawyer’s delight because he could pick out inconsistencies between the unfailingly different accounts each time to make out that a prosecution witness was unreliable and/or lying.”

This would have been the case even if Lawende had actually named an individual he claims he saw but Lawende’s evidence was far from that.

I might add by way of comment that the suggestion that a witness would not have been able to give evidence at trial on a specific point because he had already given evidence at an inquest on that point where the defendant had been unable to hear it, or challenge it, is utterly preposterous. The same witness would have given his evidence at trial where the defence would have been able to challenge it then. The defendant would, therefore, have had a fair trial. What happened earlier at the inquest, where rules of evidence were very different, would have been utterly irrelevant to this question.

By way of illustration here is a defence counsel at trial making the type of objection that Mr Lucky seems to anticipate had Mr Lawende previously given his evidence at the inquest:

Prosecution Counsel: Mr Lawende, could you describe the man you saw that night?
Lawende: Yes, he was –
Defence Counsel: Objection my lord. This evidence is inadmissible.
Judge: On what ground?
Defence Counsel: Mr Lawende already gave this evidence at the inquest?
Judge: Yes. And?
Defence Counsel: The prisoner was not present my Lord so he wasn’t able to challenge it.
Judge: But the prisoner hadn’t then been arrested or charged had he?
Defence Counsel: No, but it’s the principle my Lord.
Judge: What principle exactly?
Defence Counsel: The principle that a party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence.
Judge: But the prisoner is here now isn’t he and you are representing him?
Defence Counsel: Yes my Lord.
Judge: So you can challenge the evidence today can’t you?
Defence Counsel: Well, yes my Lord.
Judge: So what does it matter that the witness already gave the identification evidence at the inquest where none of the jury here today were present.
Defence Counsel: Er, it renders it inadmissible my Lord.
Judge: No it doesn’t, now sit down and stop being a complete tw-- (word drowned out by laughter in court).

You've had weeks and have clearly spend some time over this and you are unable to source an actual legal argument to counter what I've said and can only resort to childish mockery.

I might just add that evidence being given at an inquest (and committal proceedings) prior to a trial was a defence lawyer’s delight because he could pick out inconsistencies between the unfailingly different accounts each time to make out that a prosecution witness was unreliable and/or lying.

That's the problem that's exactly what they're trying to prevent, but that cannot be given as the reason at trial ! If the judge said to the prosecution “why was this witnesses description of the clothes not given at the inquest?” they have to give a legal argument – they can't say the witnesses memory's on the blink and you get a different answer every time you ask. They have to say something like “ As nothing at the inquest depended on it, with the coroner' s jurys permission it was deemed safer to withold the witnesses description, in case it needed to be examined under oath at trial, m'lud”

The fact remains they want to give the prosecution the best chance to succeed, that's why the description has not gone down in evidence, nothing to do with a Policeman murdering Eddowes.

[Pierre]

This is nothing more than legal gibberish.

Mr Lucky has never provided any authority for his claim and it has no meaning.

I think he has in mind a general legal rule that a person accused must have an opportunity of answering a statement against him in order to render it admissible in evidence.

Jervis on the Coroners Act of 1887, however, clearly states that the very opposite of what Mr Lucky is trying to say is the case at an inquest:

"The general rule that the party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence, is clearly inapplicable to coroners inquests, at which there is no accused party."

Jervis also states:

"…ordinarily, where there can be no cross-examination, depositions are not admissible; but those taken before the coroner have been said to be an exception to this general rule. The coroner is an elective officer, appointed on behalf of the public, to make inquiry about the matter within his jurisdiction, and therefore the law presumes that the depositions made before him will be fairly and impartially taken."

It really is very clear. The city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that Lawende’s description of the man he saw at the scene of the crime could have had any effect on any prosecution of a person later arrested of the crime.

This would have been the case even if Lawende had actually named an individual he claims he saw but Lawende’s evidence was far from that.

I might add by way of comment that the suggestion that a witness would not have been able to give evidence at trial on a specific point because he had already given evidence at an inquest on that point where the defendant had been unable to hear it, or challenge it, is utterly preposterous. The same witness would have given his evidence at trial where the defence would have been able to challenge it then. The defendant would, therefore, have had a fair trial. What happened earlier at the inquest, where rules of evidence were very different, would have been utterly irrelevant to this question.

By way of illustration here is a defence counsel at trial making the type of objection that Mr Lucky seems to anticipate had Mr Lawende previously given his evidence at the inquest:

Prosecution Counsel: Mr Lawende, could you describe the man you saw that night?
Lawende: Yes, he was –
Defence Counsel: Objection my lord. This evidence is inadmissible.
Judge: On what ground?
Defence Counsel: Mr Lawende already gave this evidence at the inquest?
Judge: Yes. And?
Defence Counsel: The prisoner was not present my Lord so he wasn’t able to challenge it.
Judge: But the prisoner hadn’t then been arrested or charged had he?
Defence Counsel: No, but it’s the principle my Lord.
Judge: What principle exactly?
Defence Counsel: The principle that a party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence.
Judge: But the prisoner is here now isn’t he and you are representing him?
Defence Counsel: Yes my Lord.
Judge: So you can challenge the evidence today can’t you?
Defence Counsel: Well, yes my Lord.
Judge: So what does it matter that the witness already gave the identification evidence at the inquest where none of the jury here today were present.
Defence Counsel: Er, it renders it inadmissible my Lord.
Judge: No it doesn’t, now sit down and stop being a complete tw-- (word drowned out by laughter in court).

I might just add that evidence being given at an inquest (and committal proceedings) prior to a trial was a defence lawyer’s delight because he could pick out inconsistencies between the unfailingly different accounts each time to make out that a prosecution witness was unreliable and/or lying.

The would-haves are back.

[David Orsam]

Actually, I do “honestly” know as I have repeatedly explained; the description has not been used whilst the witness was under oath so that it can, if necessary, still be used at trial as prosecution evidence. Otherwise the defence council would be able to object that the description had gone down on record without the defendant being able to hear it and thereby challenge it, which is his right. The defendant must have a fair trial, he must hear all the evidence against him.

This is nothing more than legal gibberish.

Mr Lucky has never provided any authority for his claim and it has no meaning.

I think he has in mind a general legal rule that a person accused must have an opportunity of answering a statement against him in order to render it admissible in evidence.

Jervis on the Coroners Act of 1887, however, clearly states that the very opposite of what Mr Lucky is trying to say is the case at an inquest:

"The general rule that the party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence, is clearly inapplicable to coroners inquests, at which there is no accused party."

Jervis also states:

"…ordinarily, where there can be no cross-examination, depositions are not admissible; but those taken before the coroner have been said to be an exception to this general rule. The coroner is an elective officer, appointed on behalf of the public, to make inquiry about the matter within his jurisdiction, and therefore the law presumes that the depositions made before him will be fairly and impartially taken."

It really is very clear. The city solicitor could not possibly have been worried that Lawende’s description of the man he saw at the scene of the crime could have had any effect on any prosecution of a person later arrested of the crime.

This would have been the case even if Lawende had actually named an individual he claims he saw but Lawende’s evidence was far from that.

I might add by way of comment that the suggestion that a witness would not have been able to give evidence at trial on a specific point because he had already given evidence at an inquest on that point where the defendant had been unable to hear it, or challenge it, is utterly preposterous. The same witness would have given his evidence at trial where the defence would have been able to challenge it then. The defendant would, therefore, have had a fair trial. What happened earlier at the inquest, where rules of evidence were very different, would have been utterly irrelevant to this question.

By way of illustration here is a defence counsel at trial making the type of objection that Mr Lucky seems to anticipate had Mr Lawende previously given his evidence at the inquest:

Prosecution Counsel: Mr Lawende, could you describe the man you saw that night?
Lawende: Yes, he was –
Defence Counsel: Objection my lord. This evidence is inadmissible.
Judge: On what ground?
Defence Counsel: Mr Lawende already gave this evidence at the inquest?
Judge: Yes. And?
Defence Counsel: The prisoner was not present my Lord so he wasn’t able to challenge it.
Judge: But the prisoner hadn’t then been arrested or charged had he?
Defence Counsel: No, but it’s the principle my Lord.
Judge: What principle exactly?
Defence Counsel: The principle that a party accused must have had an opportunity of answering a statement, by its being made in his hearing, in order to render it admissible in evidence.
Judge: But the prisoner is here now isn’t he and you are representing him?
Defence Counsel: Yes my Lord.
Judge: So you can challenge the evidence today can’t you?
Defence Counsel: Well, yes my Lord.
Judge: So what does it matter that the witness already gave the identification evidence at the inquest where none of the jury here today were present.
Defence Counsel: Er, it renders it inadmissible my Lord.
Judge: No it doesn’t, now sit down and stop being a complete tw-- (word drowned out by laughter in court).

I might just add that evidence being given at an inquest (and committal proceedings) prior to a trial was a defence lawyer’s delight because he could pick out inconsistencies between the unfailingly different accounts each time to make out that a prosecution witness was unreliable and/or lying.

[Mr Lucky]

There are rules for what we may call "knowledge".
Regars, Pierre

Thanks for your help, I think we can draw a line under this now.

[Mr Lucky]

Good Evening,



I posted

"Mr Lucky, that is a very good explanation and it may well be accurate, i tend to agree with it, however we cannot KNOW the reason, we can suspect and are probably right."



I am agreeing with much of what you post.


And of course it has nothing to do with how legal processes work, of any belief you may think I have

And you are very probably right about the reason. Which I repeat again!

However and it is a big however No one can KNOW what was in the mind of someone 128 years ago.

It's got nothing to do with what's going on in someone mind years ago. The OP's question was this;-

The city solicitor said that for particular reasons evidence about the dress of the man should not be given.

The only thing Lawende was allowed to say was that the man had a peaked cap.

Why did they withhold the information about the dress of the man seen with Eddowes before the murder?

It's a question about inquest procedure reguarding giving evidence, basically what are these “particular reasons” mentioned by the solicitor

One cannot KNOW that was the reason, you can certainly suspect and surmise based on experience of the legal system, which I assume you have from your posts.

However it is not possible to know if there were any other reasons involved.

Yes that's the same trite philosophical position again! We do know whats happening assuming the following;-
1) The Inquest is lawful
2) The people involved investigating the murder of Eddowes, the Police, the city solicitor , the home office/government, the Coroner, the Inquest jury, and the public are genuinely attempting to do their duty

Because if (1) and (2) are true then there aren't any “other reasons”, the OP's is assuming differently, so he can justify coming to other conclusions – he does have “other reasons”, ie some sort of conspiracy, but otherwise we can assume the inquest is working as normal.

And the funny thing is that you acknowledge this:

"Well, we can't know in a absolute philosphical sense"

I'm not acknowledging it at all, as would be demonstated by printing the whole sentence rather than half of it.

Let me be clear no one is or was questioning your honesty, I know nothing about you to make any such statement, only the words used.

Fair enough, but you should consider the consequencies of posting blanket statements like “Honestly, NO one can be sure of this” shortly after others have answered when dealing with issues of fact rather than opinion.

However the reply to me, accusing me of being of the "Don't think" school was rude!

I haven't accused you personally of “being of the don't think school”, I have accused you of adopting the same philosophical position as the 'don't think' school.

[Pierre]

[QUOTE=Mr Lucky;398665]

Well, we can't know in a absolute philosphical sense but frankly that's just a trite position typically adopted by ripperologist of the 'don't think' school.

Hi there,

There are rules for what we may call "knowledge". In the case ot the Whitechapel murders pure philosphy is not relevant. We must do source criticism so we need historical tools. When we use historical tools we agree about the rules for knowledge.

We do know whats happening assuming the following;-

This will be interesting!

1) The Inquest is lawful

That is normative history. It postulates that events happened because there was a norm regulating the events. But research shows that the norm is a theoretical construction not always corresponding with events.

2) The people involved investigating the murder of Eddowes, the Police, the city solicitor , the home office/government, the Coroner, the Inquest jury, and the public are genuinely attempting to do their duty

Whoever gave you that idea? Voltaire?

I have never seen reason to believe that the Eddowes inquest/ murder investigation is involved in any conspiracy, cover up or contemporary deception, so I can *know* what’s happening by reference to the known workings of the legal system at the time.

But legal systems are social systems. They depend on social indiviuals with motives.

Those investigating the murder only had to know 'beyond reasonable doubt' to hang the man responsible, a similar level of knowledge should be enough for those with a genuine interest in the murders today.

It sounds as if we do not have any use for people anymore. The legal system is a self fulfilling autopoietic construction that works without interference of humans!

That is, of course, a purely theoretical construction and not history.

Regars, Pierre

[Elamarna]

No I'm not being rude, I'm objecting to your unwarrented suggestion that i'm not giving my opinion “honestly” which is based on nothing more than your faulty belief that we cannot KNOW what's happening at the inquest, a position you've adopted which is completely at odds with how the legal process actually works.

Good Evening,



I posted

"Mr Lucky, that is a very good explanation and it may well be accurate, i tend to agree with it, however we cannot KNOW the reason, we can suspect and are probably right."



I am agreeing with much of what you post.


And of course it has nothing to do with how legal processes work, of any belief you may think I have

And you are very probably right about the reason. Which I repeat again!

However and it is a big however No one can KNOW what was in the mind of someone 128 years ago.

One cannot KNOW that was the reason, you can certainly suspect and surmise based on experience of the legal system, which I assume you have from your posts.

However it is not possible to know if there were any other reasons involved.


And the funny thing is that you acknowledge this:

"Well, we can't know in a absolute philosphical sense"



Let me be clear no one is or was questioning your honesty, I know nothing about you to make any such statement, only the words used.


However the reply to me, accusing me of being of the "Don't think" school was rude!

Goodnight

Steve

[Mr Lucky]

Mr Lucky

That is just plan rude.

No I'm not being rude, I'm objecting to your unwarrented suggestion that i'm not giving my opinion “honestly” which is based on nothing more than your faulty belief that we cannot KNOW what's happening at the inquest, a position you've adopted which is completely at odds with how the legal process actually works.

[Henry Flower]

When your post is all in bold it defeats the whole point of using bold in the first place. Bold should be used for the odd word or sentence.
If you're using bold to make the whole post stand out from the other posts, and I can only speak for myself here, let me say it doesn't work that way. Quite the opposite as it gives me the impression that you think what you say is more important than what other forum members say. So I'm drawn away, rather than drawn to, your post

Another forum member, The 21st Century Investigator, also does the same sometimes. For me personally you have another thing in common with him, I avoid posts from both of you anyway. I'm just hoping I can educate when it comes to using bold in posts.

Ozzy, I take my hat off to you. Every single word absolutely nails it.

Well said, well said.

PS - Does anyone else know of any academics or professional historians who try to grab attention by writing entirely in bold text?

No, me neither.