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Originally posted by Garry Wroe
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Years ago, Paul, whilst studying scientific research methods, I was given the following as an example of hypo-inductive reasoning:-
Whereas I genuinely marvel at the depth of Anderson-related research undertaken by yourself, Stewart and others, I doubt that it will ever prove that Anderson exaggerated (or worse) the circumstances surrounding the Seaside Home identification.
To my mind, insufficient consideration has been given to an alternate approach. It is fairly obvious, for example, that Anderson believed that he knew the type of man the Ripper was likely to have been (an insane sexual deviant), and that he and Swanson regarded the end of the Ripper scare as providing a clue as to the killer’s identity.
It is also fairly obvious that that investigators had little, if any, tangible evidence against Kosminski, which is why almost total reliance was placed on the Seaside Home identification. The fact that Swanson bothered to state that ‘no other murder of this kind took place in London after the suspect had been identified’ would appear to reinforce this conclusion.
As I contended earlier on this thread, I think the likeliest explanation for Kosminski’s ‘identification’ may be attributed to the fact that he was diagnosed as insane and removed from the streets at a time which roughly coincided with the cessation of the murders. As such, this was less of a rigorous detective process than an exercise in hypo-inductive reasoning. Thus I have difficulty in sharing your conclusion that ‘Anderson would have known about all the serious suspects and that if he thought "Kosminski" was at worst the best of the bunch then he has to be given credence.’
To my way of thinking, Paul, there were no serious suspects, not least because the investigation was fatally flawed by Anderson’s assumption that the wanted man must have been insane and obviously homicidal. Our latter-day understanding of such offenders is sufficient to effectively exonerate Kosminski and similar such ‘suspects’. Even if we assume that Kosminski was a paranoid schizophrenic (and I long ago asserted that Kosminski’s psychopathology was indicative of hebephrenia rather then paranoia), such men are incapable of exerting the degree of victim and crime scene control that is apparent through even the most casual evaluation of the Ripper murders. From the psychological perspective alone, Kosminski could not have been Jack the Ripper. Anderson was therefore wrong, irrespective of his documented certainty regarding the issue, and no amount Anderson-related textual analysis will change that.
Returning to my opening paragraph, I will provide another example of hypo-inductive reasoning:-
That, I believe, more or less encapsulates Anderson’s case against Kosminski. And whilst I wish you well in your Anderson researches, I really do think that the time has come to consider an alternate approach – one that places greater emphasis on what he did rather than what he said.
Or even what he said he did.
John is a boy; John wears trousers.
Susan wears trousers, so must also be a boy.
Susan wears trousers, so must also be a boy.
Whereas I genuinely marvel at the depth of Anderson-related research undertaken by yourself, Stewart and others, I doubt that it will ever prove that Anderson exaggerated (or worse) the circumstances surrounding the Seaside Home identification.
To my mind, insufficient consideration has been given to an alternate approach. It is fairly obvious, for example, that Anderson believed that he knew the type of man the Ripper was likely to have been (an insane sexual deviant), and that he and Swanson regarded the end of the Ripper scare as providing a clue as to the killer’s identity.
It is also fairly obvious that that investigators had little, if any, tangible evidence against Kosminski, which is why almost total reliance was placed on the Seaside Home identification. The fact that Swanson bothered to state that ‘no other murder of this kind took place in London after the suspect had been identified’ would appear to reinforce this conclusion.
As I contended earlier on this thread, I think the likeliest explanation for Kosminski’s ‘identification’ may be attributed to the fact that he was diagnosed as insane and removed from the streets at a time which roughly coincided with the cessation of the murders. As such, this was less of a rigorous detective process than an exercise in hypo-inductive reasoning. Thus I have difficulty in sharing your conclusion that ‘Anderson would have known about all the serious suspects and that if he thought "Kosminski" was at worst the best of the bunch then he has to be given credence.’
To my way of thinking, Paul, there were no serious suspects, not least because the investigation was fatally flawed by Anderson’s assumption that the wanted man must have been insane and obviously homicidal. Our latter-day understanding of such offenders is sufficient to effectively exonerate Kosminski and similar such ‘suspects’. Even if we assume that Kosminski was a paranoid schizophrenic (and I long ago asserted that Kosminski’s psychopathology was indicative of hebephrenia rather then paranoia), such men are incapable of exerting the degree of victim and crime scene control that is apparent through even the most casual evaluation of the Ripper murders. From the psychological perspective alone, Kosminski could not have been Jack the Ripper. Anderson was therefore wrong, irrespective of his documented certainty regarding the issue, and no amount Anderson-related textual analysis will change that.
Returning to my opening paragraph, I will provide another example of hypo-inductive reasoning:-
Jack the Ripper’s crimes had about them a touch of insanity.
Kosminski was insane and so must have been Jack the Ripper.
Kosminski was insane and so must have been Jack the Ripper.
That, I believe, more or less encapsulates Anderson’s case against Kosminski. And whilst I wish you well in your Anderson researches, I really do think that the time has come to consider an alternate approach – one that places greater emphasis on what he did rather than what he said.
Or even what he said he did.
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