Knowing

[David Orsam]

And you can not explain what you mean when you say fact, but I think you mean murder.

It's not my word, my dear boy, so it cannot contain any meaning that exists in my head. I think you will probably find it mentioned in the Criminal Law Act of 1826, if you are determined to get to the bottom of the fact.

[John G]

And you can not explain what you mean when you say fact, but I think you mean murder.

You might want to look up William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 4, Chapter 3.

[Pierre]

Oh my dear boy, I wasn't suggesting that anyone was like you. Not at all. You are quite unique, my dear boy, and long may you remain so. No, my dear boy, I said that if, like you, they did not know what an accessory before the fact was then we can probably safely conclude they were not worried about the possibility of committing such an offence.

And you can not explain what you mean when you say fact, but I think you mean murder.

[David Orsam]

They were not like me and the question is what you mean when you say fact.

Oh my dear boy, I wasn't suggesting that anyone was like you. Not at all. You are quite unique, my dear boy, and long may you remain so. No, my dear boy, I said that if, like you, they did not know what an accessory before the fact was then we can probably safely conclude they were not worried about the possibility of committing such an offence.

[John G]

I don't suppose we need to get involved in a protracted legal debate here but it's a little bit more complicated than that because R v Coney was about a crime (of assault) occurring in a public place witnessed by a large crowd (i.e. it was an unlawful boxing match) and the question was whether the spectators were guilty of assault simply by being there. An express distinction was made in the judgment between this type of scenario and "assassinations done in private" where, even if a witness took no part in the crime, he or she could, it was said, be found guilty of an aiding and abetting offence simply by being present, if no action was taken in such a case to prevent the murder or bring the killer to justice.

Likewise, a charge of being an accessory after the fact could be made if an individual "received, harboured and maintained" a murderer (and some indictments might add the words "relieved, aided, comforted and assisted").

Anyway, the actual legal position is not important because I think the point of consideration – and certainly the point I was raising by quoting from those books - is whether most members of the public would have had a clue about the precise legal position, i.e. the meaning of aiding and abetting etc. or whether it was illegal to withhold information about a murder from the police.

In respect of receiving: "If the husband commit a felony or treason, and the wife knowingly receive him, she shall neither be accessory after as to the felony, nor principal as to the treason, for she is sub potestate viri, and she is bound to receive her husband." (Per Lord Hale, Pleas of the Crown.)

[Pierre]

My dear boy, how delightful of you to answer my question with a question of your own. The question I suppose is what was in the mind of the person in question but if, like you, they did not know what an accessory before the fact was, then we can probably safely conclude that were not worried that they could be charged with such an offence, whether they had committed it or not.

They were not like me and the question is what you mean when you say fact.

[David Orsam]

What do you mean when you say "before the fact"?

My dear boy, how delightful of you to answer my question with a question of your own. The question I suppose is what was in the mind of the person in question but if, like you, they did not know what an accessory before the fact was, then we can probably safely conclude that were not worried that they could be charged with such an offence, whether they had committed it or not.

[John G]

I don't suppose we need to get involved in a protracted legal debate here but it's a little bit more complicated than that because R v Coney was about a crime (of assault) occurring in a public place witnessed by a large crowd (i.e. it was an unlawful boxing match) and the question was whether the spectators were guilty of assault simply by being there. An express distinction was made in the judgment between this type of scenario and "assassinations done in private" where, even if a witness took no part in the crime, he or she could, it was said, be found guilty of an aiding and abetting offence simply by being present, if no action was taken in such a case to prevent the murder or bring the killer to justice.

Likewise, a charge of being an accessory after the fact could be made if an individual "received, harboured and maintained" a murderer (and some indictments might add the words "relieved, aided, comforted and assisted").

Anyway, the actual legal position is not important because I think the point of consideration – and certainly the point I was raising by quoting from those books - is whether most members of the public would have had a clue about the precise legal position, i.e. the meaning of aiding and abetting etc. or whether it was illegal to withhold information about a murder from the police.

In R v Clarkson (1971), where Dictum of Hawkins J in Coney (1882) was approved and followed, it was held that mere voluntary presence at the scene of a crime doesn't necessarily amount to aiding and abetting on the ground of encouragement. However, if they were voluntarily and purposefully present, and offered no opposition to it, or at least expressed no dissent, a jury would, in certain circumstances, be entitled to consider whether this amounted to wilful encouragement, and therefore that he aided and abetted.

[Pierre]

And do you think such a person might have been worried that they could be charged as an accessory before the fact?

What do you mean when you say "before the fact"?

[David Orsam]

Since you ask and since you like to hear your own words being repeated, the answer is that we must hypothesize that such a person was exceedingly worried about things described in your #20.

My dear boy, I squeal with delight at my humble prose so hitting the mark of your charming hypothesizing.

[Pierre]

My dear boy, how absolutely right you are. It's always a good idea, not to mention charming and delightful, to repeat exactly what I have said.

And do you think such a person might have been worried that they could be charged as an accessory before the fact?

Since you ask and since you like to hear your own words being repeated, the answer is that we must hypothesize that such a person was exceedingly worried about things described in your #20.

[David Orsam]

That is correct, David: Unless we identify one of those members of the public as someone with specialised knowledge of the criminal law.

My dear boy, how absolutely right you are. It's always a good idea, not to mention charming and delightful, to repeat exactly what I have said. And do you think such a person might have been worried that they could be charged as an accessory before the fact?

[Pierre]

Oh my dear boy, what a charmingly meaningless statement for, you see, every individual member of the public is a specific individual so unless you identify one of those members of the public as someone with specialised knowledge of the criminal law, the chances are that this person of whom you speak has the same legal knowledge as most other members of the public, i.e. very little. I don't see how the fact that this person "knew the Whitechapel murderer and knew what he had done and was about to do" actually changes that.

That is correct, David: Unless we identify one of those members of the public as someone with specialised knowledge of the criminal law.

Pierre

[David Orsam]

But in the case where someone knew the Whitechapel murderer and knew what he had done and was about to do, i.e. knew when he was going to commit another murder and why, that person was a specific individual and not "most members of the public".

Oh my dear boy, what a charmingly meaningless statement for, you see, every individual member of the public is a specific individual so unless you identify one of those members of the public as someone with specialised knowledge of the criminal law, the chances are that this person of whom you speak has the same legal knowledge as most other members of the public, i.e. very little. I don't see how the fact that this person "knew the Whitechapel murderer and knew what he had done and was about to do" actually changes that.

[Pierre]

I don't suppose we need to get involved in a protracted legal debate here but it's a little bit more complicated than that because R v Coney was about a crime (of assault) occurring in a public place witnessed by a large crowd (i.e. it was an unlawful boxing match) and the question was whether the spectators were guilty of assault simply by being there. An express distinction was made in the judgment between this type of scenario and "assassinations done in private" where, even if a witness took no part in the crime, he or she could, it was said, be found guilty of an aiding and abetting offence simply by being present, if no action was taken in such a case to prevent the murder or bring the killer to justice.

Likewise, a charge of being an accessory after the fact could be made if an individual "received, harboured and maintained" a murderer (and some indictments might add the words "relieved, aided, comforted and assisted").

Anyway, the actual legal position is not important because I think the point of consideration – and certainly the point I was raising by quoting from those books - is whether most members of the public would have had a clue about the precise legal position, i.e. the meaning of aiding and abetting etc. or whether it was illegal to withhold information about a murder from the police.

But in the case where someone knew the Whitechapel murderer and knew what he had done and was about to do, i.e. knew when he was going to commit another murder and why, that person was a specific individual and not "most members of the public".