Did the Police know who Jack was or was the withdrawal of officers, purely financial?
It has long been debated, that the suspect we know as Jack the Ripper was known to the police and that is why the investigation was concluded so abruptly with regards to officer presence in Whitechapel. It is not my intention to further discuss this on this tread, but to look at another possible solution to this, that of sheer cost.
If we take into consideration other high profile incidents such as Bloody Sunday in November 1887, were 2000 officers were deployed, out of a possible 6000 officers required at any one day to cover general police duties (total force strength of 14,000).
The cost of such an operation, would not be insignificant. Other comments conducted by A Division & H Division during the Fenian bombing campaign again would be draining in both manpower and financial resources
After the Fenian Salford bomb attack, arrangements were made to protect London's major buildings with H Division had 6 Constables in two reliefs guarding the Tower of London and extra precautions were taken at the Royal Mint and the Houses of Parliament by A Division.
Interesting on the subject of A Division on a normal footing Whitehall alone had 102 Constables and 37 Inspectors. In 1883 A Division requested another 27 Inspectors, 50 Sergeants and 500 Constables, the latter to be drawn from men on the waiting list. The Albert Memorial even had it's own guard during the day and night consisting two Constables and three patrols to around it.
By 1885 of the 13,000 Officers in the Metropolitan Police 1,100 were immobilised by anti-Fenian duties. With 18 Inspectors , 41 Sergeants and 971 Constables assigned to protection duties , 23 Constables at Buckingham Palace and 63 at the Royal Parks, 93 on personal protection duty. 87 men protected the homes of parliament 53 on bridge duty, 49 at prisons and 8 on plain clothes park patrols.
A massive undertaking from a none bottomless resourse pit.
Iím in do doubt that such events like a Lord Mayorís show and. Golden Jubilee also put a big dent in the policing budget.
In 1887 H Division had 1 Supt, 30 Insps, 46 Sgts, 473 Constables and J Division had 1 Supt, 38 Insps, 56 Sgts and 522 Constables.
The first batch of police reinforcements from other divisions appear to have been dispatched to the district (H & J divisions) following the murder of Annie Chapman, (this `special detection force` being 3 Insps 9 Sgts and 6 Constables on the 8th September this being increased to 51 in October and another 28 employed to carry out the house to house searches) it should also be noted that 120 Constables (and the relevant number of Sgts) of H division were deployed on night duty of these 43 came from a special augmentation from H division men and 77 had been supplied nightly from other divisions) , PC Alfred LONG of A Division & PC Alfred SCHOLES of D Division being two such examples. (It would be interesting to know whether the same 77 men were supplied by each division or whether different men were used nightly?)
Following the double event, one of the first things Sir Charles WARREN, did was to draft additional extra men to the district, from other divisions. An example of one of these men is PC Frederick Porter WENSLEY of L Division (he'd only been in uniform 9 months at the time).
It appears that `hundreds` of officers were drafted and usually patrolled in pairs (27 men are certainly documented as being employed in plain clothes work at this time, this being increased to 89 in October and 143 in November, being reduced to 102 in January and 47 in February 1889.
It appears that these men involved in both plain clothes and uniformed work. These resources begin to be reduced in both H & J divisions in February 1889 (in December 1888 their numbers appear to be 1 Inspectors, 9 Sergeants and 126 Constables), these men appear to have come from other divisions, worked constant night shifts and were coming from some distance away (which they had to pay for at their own expense).
These additional men had been ceased by March 1889. In July 1889 following the murder or Alice McKENZIE it was amused that the Ripper had resumed his killings so the men and patrols , (these being 3 Sgts 39 Constables in plain clothes and 22 extra men in uniform). Two months later following the discovery of the Pinchin Street torso, an additional 100 plain clothes men were drafted in, these continued until April 1890 when they finally ceased. These officer numbers mainly relate to plain clothes officers drafted in, there were also uniformed officers drafted in, but there is very little documented about there numbers, all that I have been able to confirm is that when the plain clothes patrols were disbanded 34 uniformed officers originally detailed for patrols in Trafalgar Square (A division) remained in Whitechapel and were still there in the summer of 1889.
Although not direct evidence of why the officer numbers were reduced does prove that such deployments could not be continued long term especially when the need (as no other killings take place coupled with a wain in public interest and a loss of concern, people soon forget and live soon begins to return to a level of normality.
Does all this suggest that it was in fact general costs and not a know suspect that lead to the reduction?
This suggests that if Druitt or David Cohen, mixed with Kosminski was the ripper, or if Kosminski himself was put in a private asylum and suspected of being Jack - circa March 89, Police didn't know for sure summer 1889 or maybe as late as April 90. Very informative Post Mr Cat
Last edited by Darryl Kenyon : 01-22-2018 at 04:33 AM.
Reason: Adding to post
I spent my entire working life in local government, and the only certainties that existed for myself and my colleagues were:
1. Management control the purse strings with a religious zeal.
2. The centre will always protect itself.
There is no reason to believe that things were any different in 1888 for the Met and City Police.
The pressure would certainly have been pretty intense on the top brass to solve the murders, or at least to convince their political masters that the murders had ceased due to the sterling work that their men had carried out.
If there were plaudits to be handed out, they wouldn't have trickled down to the men and officers on the front line.
Is this perhaps why many of the top brass in the police alluded to the fact that they actually knew who the killer was, and that the threat was now gone due to the murderer being dead* or incarcerated* (*delete where applicable).
As long as there were no more murders, the top brass could breathe a sigh of relief, and gently and persistently drop hints that while the murderer may not actually have been caught, the threat was no more.
All due to the sterling and inspired leadership of the Police top brass.
There was a lot of crime in Whitechapel which I am sure didn't stop during the Ripper murders. So while cost reduction needed to be addressed they also needed to reallocate manpower resources so that they were no longer putting all of their eggs in one basket.
That Office was the responsibility of the Home Secretary, until July 2000.
Responsibility to fund, true.
However Pennefather was the man who directed those funds, much to the annoyance of Warren. In fact, historically Commissioners and Recievers often clashed on where monies should be directed, even from day one with Mayne and Wray.